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Abstract: During the last five years the CJEU had to decide on more than 50 pre-
liminary references in the area of consumer contract law. As a consequence there
are far more than 100 decisions available which represent the increasingly con-
crete basis for a European contract law. Particularly striking is the rising number
of questions referred to the CJEU by the new Member States. With regard to
quantity two fields stand out: legal conflicts about financial services of all kinds
and about passenger rights. Since the CJEU has developed independent dog-
matics for some areas of contract law, it might be necessary to rethink legal
categories on the national level.
Résumé: Durant les cinq dernières années, la CJUE a dû répondre à plus de
50 questions préjudicielles dans le domaine du droit des contrats de consomma-
tion. En conséquence, il y a bien plus de 100 décisions disponibles qui représen-
tent une base concrète croissante pour un droit européen des contrats. L’accrois-
sement du nombre de questions adressées à la CJUE par les nouveaux Etats
membres est particulièrement frappant. Quantitativement, deux domaines se
distinguent: les conflits juridiques relatifs aux services financiers de toutes sortes
et ceux relatifs aux droits des passagers. Comme la CJUE a développé des inter-
prétations propres dans quelques domaines du droit des contrats, il pourrait être
nécessaire de repenser les catégories juridiques au niveau national.
Zusammenfassung: In den letzten fünf Jahren hatte der EuGH mehr als 50 Vorla-
geverfahren im Bereich des Verbrauchervertragsrechts zu entscheiden. Per dato
liegen damit weit mehr als 100 Entscheidungen vor, die in immer dichterer Form
die Grundlagen für ein europäisches Vertragsrecht konkretisieren. Auffällig ist
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die steigende Zahl von Vorlagen aus den neuen Mitgliedstaaten. In der Sache
dominieren in quantitativer Hinsicht zwei Bereiche: rechtliche Auseinanderset-
zungen um Finanzdienstleistungen jedweder Art und das Passagier- bzw. Reise-
recht. Für Teilbereiche des Vertragsrechts entwickelt der EuGH eine eigenstän-
dige Dogmatik, die ein Überdenken nationaler rechtlicher Kategorien notwendig
macht.
Keywords: consumer law, unfair terms, doorstep selling, distance selling, sale of
consumer goods
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Part I
I Contract Law
1 Unfair terms in consumer contracts (Case C-243/08 Pannon
GSM; case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones; case
C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid; case
C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing; case C-453/10 Pereničová and
Perenič; case C-472/10 Invitel; case C-618/10 Banco Español
de Crédito; case C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank; case C-415/11 Aziz;
case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb; case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse and
de Man Garabito; case C-397/11 Jőrös; case C-413/12
Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y
León; case C-482/12 Macinský and Macinská; case C-470/12
Pohotovosť)
a) Obligation of the national court to examine of its own motion the unfairness
of a term conferring jurisdiction (Case C-243/08 Pannon GSM)
aa) Facts
The Hungarian Budaörsi Városi Bíróság referred to the European Court of Justice
(CJEU) the question of whether the non-binding nature of an unfair term is the
consequence of an ipso jure effect of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC1 or whether
the consumer has to contest the validity of such a term by lodging the relevant
application. The referring court raised furthermore the question of whether the
obligation of the national court to rule of its own motion on the unfairness of a
contractual term exists irrespective of the type of action and which factors it must
consider in assessing the possible unfairness of the contractual term.
The parties entered into a subscription contract for the provision of mobile
telephone services. Under the terms and conditions, the two parties accepted that
the court for the place where Pannon has its principal place of business has
jurisdiction for any dispute arising from the subscription contract or in relation to
it. Pursuant to that term, Pannon applied to the Budaörs District Court for an order
1 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts,OJ 1993 L95/
29; for a recent assessment of the case-law relating to the Directive, see also N. Gavrilovic, ‘The
Unfair Contract Terms Directive through the Practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union:
Interpretation or SomethingMore?’ (2013) 2 European Review of Contract Law 193.
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for payment. The consumer then filed a statement of opposition to that order
without questioning the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Although the court had
doubts about the validity of the jurisdiction clause, it was prevented from ques-
tioning its territorial jurisdiction because the consumer already made the first
filing of her defence to the substance of the dispute.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU held that the non-binding nature of an unfair contract clause does not
require the consumer to have successfully contested the validity of such a term
beforehand.2 Relying on its earlier rulings in Cofidis3 andMostaza Claro,4 the CJEU
emphasized the obligation of the national court to determine the unfairness of a
term of its own motion, once it has the necessary legal and factual elements
necessary for that task. This obligation also exists as regards the assessment of its
own territorial jurisdiction. Without this power, the consumer’s own unawareness
of his rights or fear of the costs of an action could lead him to not exercise his
rights.5 This does not exclude the possibility that the term in question may be
applicable, if the consumer, after having been informed of it by that court, decides
not to assert its unfair or non-binding status.6 The CJEU also pointed to its finding
in Océano Grupo7 that a jurisdiction clause may be regarded as unfair. Never-
theless, the CJEU with reference Freiburger Kommunalbauten,8 left it to the na-
tional courts to assess the possible unfairness of a particular term in the light of
the particular circumstances of the case.9
2 Case 243/08 Pannon GSMZrt v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713 (CJEU), paragraph 24.
3 Case 473/00 Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout [2002] ECR I-10875 (CJEU); discussed by J.W. Rut-
gers, (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 87.
4 Case 168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10421 (CJEU);
discussed byM.B.M. Loos, (2007) 4 European Review of Contract Law 439; see also N. Reich, ‘More
clarity after “Claro”?’ (2007) 1 European Review of Contract Law 41.
5 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraphs 30–32.
6 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraph 33.
7 Joined cases 240/98 to 244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA et al v Roció Murciano Quintero et al
[2000] ECR I-4941 (CJEU); discussed by Rutgers, n 3 above, 87.
8 Case 237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Ludger Hofstetter
and Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403 (CJEU); discussed by M.W. Hesselink, (2006) 3 European
Review of Contract Law 366.
9 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraphs 40–43.
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cc) Integration in the case-law
The ruling provides clarification from the CJEU that the national courts are under
anobligation to carryout an exofficioexamination. InOcéanoGrupo, theCJEUwent
only towards a power of ex officio examination. In Cofidis the CJEU had already
adoptedanobligationof exofficio examination,whichwas statedevenmore clearly
inMostaza Claro.10 A new element is that the consumermay decide to not assert the
unfair status of a clause after prior notice of it by the national court. This regulation
is consistent with the idea of consumer protection through information. In accor-
dance with the principle of party autonomy, the CJEU takes into account that it
may be in the interest of the consumer to enforce the clause in individual cases
and to avoid the consumer from having a protection forced upon him.11
A point of discussion in the literature is the division of competence between
the CJEU and national courts. In Océano Grupo it was assumed that the CJEU has
taken a comprehensive control over the final determination of the unfairness of a
jurisdiction clause.12 In Freiburger Kommunalbauten, however, the CJEU stressed
that the final assessment of the unfairness of a particular contract clause is to be
made by the national courts. The task of the CJEU is confined to the interpretation
of general evaluation criteria.13 In Pannon GSM, the CJEU tries to bring its
decisions in Océano Grupo and Freiburger Kommunalbauten into conformity. The
jurisdiction clause may be regarded as unfair, but the final assessment is left to
the Hungarian court.14 The CJEU clarifies that it had only established general
criteria for the definition of unfairness in Océano Grupo.15
10 A. Ancery and M. Wissink, case note, (2010) 2 European Review of Private Law 307, 308, 313;
J. Stuyck, case note, (2010) 3 Common Market Law Review 879, 892; C. Cheneviere, case note,
(2010) 2 Revue européenne de droit de la consommation 351, 354; Rutgers, n 3 above, 89, 90; Loos,
n 4 above, 443, 444; Heinig emphasizes that the obligation to examine ex officio the unfairness of
a clause results in no undue interference with the regulatory autonomy of the Member States, see
J. Heinig, ‘Die AGB-Kontrolle von Gerichtsstandsklauseln – zum Urteil Pannon des EuGH’ (2009)
24 Europäische Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 885.
11 Heinig, n 10 above, 886; Ancery and Wissink, n 10 above, 313. Osztovits and Nemessányi are
therefore of the view that the principle pacta sunt servanda prevailed over the non-binding nature
of unfair terms, see A. Osztovits and Z. Nemessányi, ‘Missbräuchliche Zuständigkeitsklauseln in
der Ungarischen Rechtsprechung im Licht der Urteile des EuGH’ (2010) 2 Zeitschrift für Europar-
echt, Internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung 22, 25.
12 Heinig, n 10 above, 886. Although ambiguous, see Stuyck, n 10 above, 892, 894.
13 Hesselink, n 8 above, 366; Loos, n 4 above, 444.
14 Critical of such a delegation to the national court at the expense of a Community-wide
harmonization, see Heinig, n 10 above, 886; for a more positive view, see Ancery and Wissink,
n 10 above, 315.
15 According to Pfeiffer, the CJEU reached this result only in a ‘severe bending’ of Océano Grupo
and yet ‘between the lines’ everything would speak nevertheless for unfairness of such a clause,
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b) Annulment of a final arbitration award in case of an unfair arbitration clause
(Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 4 de Bilbao asked whether it is
necessary for the national court hearing an action for enforcement of a final
arbitration award, made in the absence of the consumer, to determine of its own
motion whether the arbitration agreement is void and, accordingly, to annul the
award if it finds that the arbitration agreement contains an unfair arbitration
clause that is to the detriment of the consumer.
The consumer did not pay some of her telephone bills and terminated her
contract before the agreed minimum subscription period had expired. The arbitra-
tion tribunal ruled in favor of Asturcom. The consumer had neither participated
in the arbitration proceedings, nor filed a claim for annulment of the award. The
court hearing the action for enforcement of the arbitration award assumed the
unfairness of the arbitration clause. However, the Spanish law on civil procedure
does not contain any provision dealing with the assessment to be carried by the
court as to whether arbitration clauses are unfair when adjudicating on an action
for enforcement of an arbitration award that has become final.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU emphasized at the outset the importance, both for the Community legal
order and for the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata.The
principles of effectiveness and equivalence limit the application of the national
procedural law implementing the principle of res judicata.16 The current two-
month time-limit in Spain for challenging an arbitration award is consistent with
see T. Pfeiffer, ‘Prüfung missbräuchlicher Klauseln von Amts wegen (Gerichtsstand) – Günstig-
keitsprinzip nach Wahl des Verbrauchers’ (2009) 32 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2367, 2369;
also Heinig, n 10 above, 887; Stuyck, n 10 above, 894.
16 Case 40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira [2009] ECR I-9579
(CJEU), paragraphs 35–38; discussed by C. Mak, (2010) 4 European Review of Contract Law 437.
The CJEU refers to the following case law, case 126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton
International NV [1999] ECR I-3055 (CJEU); case 234/04 Rosmarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick
GmbH [2006] ECR I-2585 (CJEU); case 2/08 Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze and
Agenzia delle Entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl [2009] ECR I-7501 (CJEU); on breaching the
principle of res judicata in order to ensure the effectiveness of Union law, see: S. Schmahl and
M. Köber, ‘Durchbrechung der Rechtskraft nationaler Gerichtsentscheidungen zu Gunsten der
Effektivität des Unionsrechts?’ (2010) 24 Europäische Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 927.
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the principle of effectiveness.17 The need to comply with the principle of effective-
ness cannot be stretched so far as to mean that a national court is required to
make up fully for the total inertia on the part of the consumer concerned who, like
the defendant in the national proceedings at hand, neither participated in the
arbitration proceedings nor brought an action for annulment of the arbitration
award, which therefore became final. Consequently, the Spanish procedural rules
would not make it impossible or excessively difficult for the consumer to exercise
his rights in accordance with Directive 93/13/EEC.18 The CJEU left it to the national
court to examine the compliance with the principle of equivalence. The obligation
to examine the possible unfairness of an arbitration clause exists if the national
procedural law allows the court, of its own motion, to review an arbitration clause
because of a possible breach of national public policy rules.19 If so, it is for the
referring court to give due effect, in accordance with national law, to any finding
in relation to the arbitration award that an arbitration clause is unfair, so long as
the clause is not capable of binding the consumer.20 In contrast to the CJEU,
Advocate-General Trstenjak, the Commission, as well as both the Hungarian and
Spanish governments, took the view that the national court must have the power
in enforcement proceedings to determine of its own motion whether an arbitra-
tion clause is unfair and to annul that clause. According to Advocate-General
Trstenjak, in view of the need for effective consumer protection, it may be
necessary, in exceptional cases, to disregard the principle of res judicata.21
cc) Integration in the case-law
In Mostaza Claro,22 the CJEU held that a national court seised of an action for
annulment of an arbitration award must determine whether the arbitration agree-
17 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraphs 39–46. The time-limit in question is in accordance with
the principle of effectiveness for two main reasons: Firstly, the time period grants the consumer
sufficient time to assess whether there are grounds for challenging the award and, if necessary,
prepare the action for annulment of the award. Secondly, the time-limit only begins to run from
the date of notification of the arbitration award.
18 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraphs 47, 48.
19 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraphs 49–56.
20 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraph 58.
21 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 14.5.2009 – case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraphs 58, 75, 76. As the
Advocate-General highlighted at para 64, otherwise national law would expect the consumer to
take part in invalid proceedings in order to be able to have the contract annulled. Such an
outcome would be unacceptable and shows that the court responsible for enforcement must have
an appropriate power of review.
22 Case 168/05, n 4 above, paragraphs 38, 39.
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ment is void and annul that award where that agreement contains an unfair term,
even though the consumer has not pleaded that invalidity in the course of the
arbitration proceedings, but only in that of the action for annulment. Unlike
Mostaza Claro, the consumer in the case at hand ‘did not in any way become
involved’ in the various proceedings and, in particular, did not bring an action for
annulment of the arbitration award so that that award then had the force of res
judicata.23 The recognition of the principle of res judicata by the CJEU restricts the
consumer protection declared in Mostaza Claro from unfair arbitration clauses.24
The CJEU, however, goes a step further than the principle of equivalence usually
provides since the CJEU defines the relevant benchmark itself: Article 6(1) of
Directive 93/13/EEC must be considered as a provision which is equivalent to
national rules of public policy.25 The CJEU, as it had already indicated inMostaza
Claro, confirmed that Article 6(1) is anchored as part of the public policy.26 This
element led to wide-ranging discussions in the literature on the relationship
between public policy and mandatory rules of contract law.27
The judgment does not lead to a harmonization of the national courts’ obliga-
tion in enforcement procedures to carry out an examination of the unfairness of
arbitration clauses. In Spain there was no legal rule or uniform practice giving the
court a power to reject an application for enforcement by reference to public
policy. In the subsequent judgment, the Bilbao court of first instance enforced the
arbitration award without examining the unfairness of the arbitration clause.28
Additionally, it should be noted that in Asturcom Telecomunicaciones the CJEU
23 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraph 33.
24 Stuyck, n 10 above, 894; K. Hilbig, ‘Absoluter Verbraucherschutz bei unzulässigen AGB-
Schiedsvereinbarungen?‘ (2010) 2 Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren 74, 81; Mak criticizes that the
CJEU declined to make a comparison with Océano Grupo and thus missed the opportunity of
imposing the obligation to assess the unfairness of the arbitration clause on the arbitration
tribunal, seeMak, n 16 above, 442–444.
25 M. Ebers, case note, (2010) 4 European Review of Private Law 823, 839; H. Schebesta, ‘Does the
National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Application after Asturcom’(2010) 4
European Review of Private Law 847, 872.
26 Case 168/05, n 4 above, paragraphs 35–38; Loos, n 4 above, 443, 444.
27 As the Advocate-General Tizzano previously pointed out in his opinion delivered on 27.4.
2006 in Mostaza Claro at para 56, the danger is that ‘it might give excessively wide scope to a
concept, namely that of public policy, which traditionally refers only to rules that are regarded as
being of primary and absolute importance in a legal order’; Ebers, n 25 above, 843–846; Stuyck,
n 10 above, 891–897; Schebesta, n 25 above, 864–870; Hilbig, n 24 above, 79–81; Mak, n 16
above, 445–447.
28 Mak, n 16 above, 446–447.
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again declined the opportunity to set uniform standards for testing the fairness of
an arbitration clause.29
c) Minimum protection standard of the substantive assessment
of contract terms under Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC
(Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid)
aa) Facts
In the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Spanish Tribunal Supremo, the
question was whether, given the minimum harmonisation standard set out by
Directive 93/13/EEC, a Member State may provide in its legislation, for the benefit
of consumers, that the assessment as to whether contractual terms are unfair is to
be carried out also in respect of terms which, pursuant to Article 4(2), fall outside
the scope of such an assessment. According to Article 4(2), the assessment of the
unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the main
subject‑matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration,
in so far as these terms are in plain, intelligible language. As Spain had not
transposed Article 4(2) into its legal system, it did not provide for such a limita-
tion.
In the dispute at hand, the Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios
(Ausbanc – Association of users of banking services) initiated an action for an
injunction against Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid (Caja de Madrid).
The action was directed against the use of a ‘rounding‑up term’ in variable‑rate
consumer loan agreements used for the purchase of residential property.30
bb) Main reasoning
The Commission, the Spanish Government and Ausbanc contested the admissi-
bility of the reference for a preliminary ruling. It was submitted that the rounding-
up term does not concern the main subject-matter of the contract, but constitutes
a subsidiary element to it, with the result that Article 4(2) of the Directive is not
applicable to the dispute. However, the CJEU clarified that accord-ing to its settled
29 Already thus inMostaza Claro, see Reich, n 4 above, 43.
30 Pursuant to this clause, the nominal interest rate, variable from time to time in accordance
with the agreed reference index, is rounded up to the next quarter of a percentage point with effect
from the first revision.
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case-law, it is solely for the national court to assess the need for a preliminary
ruling and the relevance of the question to be submitted.31
The CJEU ruled that the Spanish legislation does not contravene EU law. As is
apparent from the 12th recital and Article 8 of Directive 93/13/EEC, the Directive
carried out only a partial and minimum harmonisation of national legislation
concerning unfair terms, while recognising that Member States have the option of
affording consumers a higher level of protection than that for which the Directive
provides. The Directive formally lays down the option for Member States to ‘adopt
or retain [more] stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area
covered by [the] Directive, to ensure a [greater] degree of protection for the
consumer’.32 Contrary to what Caja de Madrid argued, Article 4(2) of the Directive
cannot be regarded as laying down the scope ratione materiae of the Directive.
Article 4(2) is concerned solely with establishing the detailed rules permitting an
assessment as to whether the contract terms subject to the provisions of the
Directive are unfair. Thus, Article 8 applies to Article 4(2).33
cc) Integration in the case-law
Advocate-General Trstenjak referred to ‘the tension between the parties’ freedom
to arrange their own affairs and the need for statutory intervention in favour of
consumer protection’.34 Article 4(2) was first introduced through an amendment
of the Council. The literature indicates that the inclusion of Article 4(2) consti-
tuted a value-based decision of the Community legislature in the interest of the
parties’ freedom to arrange their own affairs and in the interest of a functioning
market based on competition in respect of price and efficiency.35 The relationship
between performance and consideration is governed by the law of supply and
demand. Paragraph 8 of the German Law on general business conditions (AGBG)
(now § 307(3) of the German Civil Code (BGB)) is seen as a template for this
provision.36
The CJEU decision is consistent with the minimum harmonization nature of
the Directive. The lack of implementation of Article 4(2) into Spanish law is not
31 Case 484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociación de Usuarios de
Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010] ECR I-4785 (CJEU), paragraphs 18–23; discussed by J. Stuyck,
(2010) 4 European Review of Contract Law 449.
32 Case 484/08, n 31 above, paragraphs 28, 29.
33 Case 484/08, n 31 above, paragraphs 32–35.
34 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 29.10.2009 – case 484/08, n 31 above, paragraph 64.
35 AG Trstenjak, n 34 above, paragraphs 61 et seq.
36 Stuyck, n 31 above, 451–454.
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contrary to the consumer protection objective of the Directive. The CJEU differ-
entiates the present situation from that in Commission v Netherlands.37 In that
case, the CJEU held that the Kingdom of the Netherlands had failed to fulfil its
obligations under the Directive, not by failing to transpose Article 4(2) thereof,
but by failing to transpose it in full, with the result that any possibility of judicial
review of terms describing the essential obligations, even where the drafting of
those terms was obscure and ambiguous, was excluded.38 The two judgments
illustrate the nature of the directive, which, according to Article 288 TFEU, is
binding regarding the result to be achieved, while granting the Member State the
choice of form and methods.39
d) Division of competences between the CJEU and the national courts; Ex officio
investigation of the legal and factual elements necessary for the examination
of a term; Upgrading of the indicative list (Case C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing)
aa) Facts
The Hungarian Budapesti II és III Kerületi Bíroság wanted to know whether the
jurisdiction of the CJEU extends to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair
term’ referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, the terms listed in the
Annex to that Directive as well as the criteria to examine a particular term. It also
asked whether the national court is obliged to undertake, of its own motion, an
investigation with a view to establishing the factual and legal elements necessary
to assess whether a term is unfair. Hungarian law permits such an examination
only at the request of either party.
In the dispute at hand, the company brought an action before the referring
court for the repayment of a debt when the consumer ceased to fulfil his contrac-
tual obligations under a loan contract to finance the purchase of a car. The
company did not bring its application for a payment order before the court where
the consumer lived, nor where it was headquartered itself, but relied on a term
included in the loan contract which conferred jurisdiction in any dispute between
the parties on the court making the reference.
37 Case 144/99 Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands [2001] ECR I-3541 (CJEU).
38 Case 484/08, n 31 above, paragraphs 36–39.
39 R. Tamas, case note, (2011) 2 Revue européenne de droit de la consommation 403, 410–412; For
an analysis of the judgment in relation to the UK Bank Charges case: S. Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract
Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’ (2011) 1Modern Law Review 106.
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bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU referred to its reasoning in Pannon GSM.40 According to Article 267
TFEU, the CJEU may be called upon by a national court to interpret concepts
appearing in an instrument of secondary law, such as the concept of ‘unfair term’
used in Article 3(1) of the Directive and its Annex, as well as the factors which the
national court must consider in assessing the possible unfairness of a contractual
term. Nevertheless, it is for the national court to determine whether a particular
term satisfies the criteria to be categorised as ‘unfair’ in light of the circumstances
of the concrete case.41 The CJEU explained the obligation of national courts on the
basis of a two-step test. In the first step, the national court must examine the
applicability of the Directive according to Article 1 in conjunction with Article 3 of
the Directive. Specifically, it must determine whether or not the exclusive territor-
ial jurisdiction clause was individually negotiated between the seller or supplier
and the consumer. If the Directive applies, in the next step it must check the
unfair nature of the jurisdiction clause.42 The CJEU recalled Océano Grupo,43 in
which a territorial jurisdiction clause in favor of the principal place of business of
the seller or supplier was qualified as unfair. Even though the clause in question
does not confer jurisdiction to the courts where the supplier or seller has his
principal place of business, it obliges the consumer to submit to the exclusive
jurisdiction of a court which may be a long way from his domicile. Consequently,
such a term falls within the group of clauses mentioned in point 1(q) of the
Annex.44
cc) Integration in the case-law
The CJEU consolidated the division of competences between the CJEU and na-
tional courts as established in Pannon GSM. The CJEU is responsible for the
interpretation of the criteria of unfairness stated in the Directive including the
Annex, while the actual application is left to the national courts.45 VB Pénzügyi
Lízing marked a turning point in the case law of the CJEU, the meaning of which
has only been revealed in subsequent decisions. Although the CJEU leaves a
margin of interpretation to the national courts, it provides increasingly concrete
40 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraphs 37–39, 44.
41 Case 137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt v Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847 (CJEU), paragraphs
39–43; discussed byW.H. Roth, (2011) 3 European Review of Contract Law 425.
42 Case 137/08, n 41 above, paragraphs 49–52.
43 Joined cases 240/98 to 244/98, n 7 above.
44 Case 137/08, n 41 above, paragraphs 53–55.
45 T. Pfeiffer, case note, (2010) 12 LMKAnmerkung, 311868.
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guidance on how national courts have to understand the rules of the Directive.
Advocate-General Trstenjak emphasized that the task of the CJEU is ‘gradually to
give specific expression to the abstract criteria for reviewing whether a term may
be classified as unfair and, with increasing experience, to establish a profile for
reviewing the unfairness of terms at the level of community law.’46 It appears that
the Annex does not merely have an indicative function, but serves as a starting
point for assessing and justifying the unfair character of a clause listed therein.47
Finally, it should be noted that Advocate-General Trstenjak declined the recogni-
tion of a general obligation of the national court to undertake an investigation of
its own motion for the purpose of obtaining the legal and factual elements
necessary to assess the unfairness of a contractual term.48
e) Effect of unfair commercial practices and unfair terms on the validity of the
contract as a whole; Coherent interpretation of consumer protection law
(Case C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič)
aa) Facts
The Slovak Okresný súd Prešov asked if Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC makes
it possible, where unfair contractual clauses are found in a consumer contract, to
conclude that the contract as a whole is not binding on the consumer, if that is
more advantageous to the consumer. The court also wanted to know whether the
specification of a level lower than the real annual percentage rate in a consumer
credit contract is an unfair commercial practice under Directive 2005/29/EC,49
and if so, what the consequences of this were for assessing the unfairness and the
validity of the contract in accordance with the Directive 93/13/EEC.
The reference has been made in the course of proceedings prompted by an
action brought by Mr and Mrs Perenič for the annulment of the consumer credit
agreement concluded between them and a non-bank institution. They claim that
the agreement contains many terms worded to their disadvantage, including an
46 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 6.7.2010 – case 137/08, n 41 above, paragraph 99.
47 N. Reich and H.-W. Micklitz, ‘AGB-Recht und UWG – (endlich) ein Ende des Kästchendenkens
nach EuGH Pereničová und Invitel?’ (2012) 7 EuropäischesWirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 257, 259.
48 AG Trstenjak, n 46 above, paragraph 110. Concurring with the Advocate-General, Pfeiffer,
n 45 above.
49 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concern-
ing unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending
Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and
of the Council,OJ 2005 L149/22.
Overview of cases before the CJEU 13
Brought to you by | Erasmus University Rotterdam
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/12/20 11:34 AM
incorrectly calculated annual percentage rate (APR). They therefore conclude that
the agreement must be declared invalid as a whole, the interests of consumer
protection being inadequately safeguarded by only partial invalidity.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU emphasized the obligation of national courts to draw all the conse-
quences that follow under national law to ensure that the consumer is not bound
by those terms. In assessing then whether the contract can exist without the
unfair terms, the national court must not consider the situation of one of the
parties to the contract, in this case the consumer, as the decisive criterion
determining the fate of the contract. This objective approach flows from the
wording of Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and the requirements of legal
certainty of economic activities. The national court must take account of the
objective pursued by the legislature of restoring the balance between the parties
while in principle preserving the validity of the contract as a whole, not in
abolishing all contracts containing unfair terms.50 The minimum harmonisation
nature the Directive, however, does allow for national legislation under which a
contract concluded between a trader and a consumer which contains one or more
unfair terms may be declared void as a whole where that will ensure better
protection of the consumer.51
Regarding the second question, the CJEU bases its view on a broad definition
of ‘commercial practice’ in Article 2(d) of Directive 2005/29/EC. The indication of
a miscalculated APR constitutes a ‘misleading’ commercial practice within the
meaning of Article 6(1)(e) if it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to
take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise.52 Due to the
broadly-defined criteria for assessing the unfairness of a contractual clause in
Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, a finding that a commercial practice is unfair is
one element among others on which the national court may base its assessment
of the unfairness of contractual terms. That element, however, is not such as to
establish, automatically and on its own, that the contested terms are unfair.53 The
failure to properly indicate the APR has no direct impact on the validity of a
consumer credit agreement under Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC. Directive
50 Case 453/10 Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ spol s r o 15.3.2012 (CJEU),
paragraphs 29–33.
51 Case 453/10, n 50 above, paragraphs 34, 35; with reference to Article 8 of the Directive, and
case 484/08, n 31 above, paragraphs 28, 29.
52 Case 453/10, n 50 above, paragraphs 38–41.
53 Case 453/10, n 50 above, paragraphs 42–44.
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2005/29 applies ‘without prejudice to contract law and in particular to the rules
on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.54 The CJEU’s judgment follows
Advocate-General Trstenjak’s opinion in full.55
cc) Integration in the case-law
Like Advocate-General Trestenjak, the CJEU also bases its reasoning on the
principle of parity in the area of contractual autonomy, which excludes one-sided
subjective legal consequences for the benefit of the consumer.56 The criteria
according to which the contract cannot objectively exist any longer are not
clarified by the CJEU. The ruling for the first time addressed the entanglement of
consumer contract law and unfair commercial practices law, both from a proce-
dural and a substantive perspective.57 Advocate-General Trstenjak stressed that
the EU acts in the area of consumer protection law must be seen as ‘part of a
single, overall set of rules which complement each other’, requiring a coherent
interpretation of the relevant rules of law.58 The CJEU followed the Advocate-
General, and so shattered the prior established separation of the two areas of law
in favor of an effective regime of consumer protection. Article 4(1) of Directive 93/
13/EEC serves as a ‘gateway’ for assessments under the legislation on fair trading
practices.59 Nevertheless, the legal consequences of a misleading indication of the
APR on the validity of the concrete contract remain unclear.60 In addition, the
CJEU does not provide clarity on whether the use of an unfair clause constitutes
an unfair commercial practice.61 To clarify the relationship between the two
54 Case 453/10, n 50 above, paragraphs 45, 46.
55 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 29.11.2011 – case 453/10, n 50 above.
56 Critical on this aspect of the judgment, see H. Jacquemin, case note, (2012) 3 Revue européenne
de droit de la consommation 575, 580.
57 H.-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, “‘Und es bewegt sich doch’? – Neues zum Unionsrecht der miss-
bräuchlichen Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen” (2012) 4 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-
recht 126.
58 AG Trstenjak, n 55 above, paragraphs 88, 89.
59 Reich andMicklitz, n 47 above, 260; AG Trstenjak, n 55 above, paragraph 124.
60 Reich and Micklitz question whether a contractual clause which relates to an unfair or
misleading advertisement can be valid in practice, see Reich and Micklitz, n 47 above, 260;
Hennigs considers that the mere finding of an unfair commercial practice cannot establish the
invalidity of a clause, see S. Hennigs, case note, (2012) 6 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheber-
recht 639, 642.
61 B. Keirsbilck, ‘The interaction between consumer protection rules on unfair contract terms
and unfair commercial practices: Perenicová and Perenic’ (2013) 1 Common Market Law Review
247, 260; Hennigs, n 60 above, 642.
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Directives and to give a concrete structure to the meaning of a ‘coherent’ inter-
pretation, further preliminary references will be necessary.
f) Unfairness of an unilateral price amendment clause; Legal effects of
an injunction on individual contracts (Case C-472/10 Invitel)
aa) Facts
The Hungarian Pest Megyei Biróság asked under what conditions the clause at
issue, which allowed for a unilateral increase in price by the seller, may be
qualified as unfair in accordance with Directive 93/13/EEC. It also asked whether
the declaration of the invalidity of an unfair term, as a result of an action for
injunction in the public interest, may produce effects with regard to all consumers
(including those who were not party to the proceedings) and whether the national
courts must also, in future and of its own motion, draw all the consequences
which are provided in national law in case of the unfairness of a term.
Due to numerous consumer complaints, the Hungarian Consumer Protection
Office (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság NFH) initiated a public interest action
against the fixed-line telephone network operator Invitel. Invitel had introduced
into its general business conditions a price amendment clause providing for
‘money order fees’ to be applied in the event of payment by money order without
any provision specifying the method of calculation of those fees. The Consumer
Protection Office requested the Hungarian court for a finding that the term in
question is void and for refund of these costs and expenses.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU referred to the division of competences between the CJEU and the
national courts as confirmed in VB Pénzügyi Lízing.62 The competence of the CJEU
is limited to giving the national court indications on the assessment of the
unfairness of the price amendment clause at hand.63 The exclusion in Article 4(2)
cannot apply to a term relating to a ‘mechanism for amending the prices of the
services provided to the consumer’.64 To determine the assessment criteria, the
CJEU referred to points 1(j) and (l) and points 2(b) and (d) of the Annex. The Annex
constitutes the ‘essential element’ on which the competent court may base its
62 Case 137/08, n 41 above, paragraph 44.
63 Case 472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt 26.4.2012 (CJEU), para-
graph 22.
64 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 23.
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assessment as to the unfair nature of that term. However, the Annex does not
suffice in itself to establish automatically the unfair nature of a contested term
under Article 3(1) of the Directive.65 The national court must consider whether ‘the
reasons for, or the method of, the amendment of fees connected with the service
to be provided are set out in plain, intelligible language and, as the case may be,
whether consumers have a right to terminate the contract.’66
The effective implementation of Article 6(1) in connection with Article 7(1)
and (2) of the Directive requires that terms of consumer contracts which are
declared to be unfair in an action for an injunction brought against the seller or
supplier concerned are not binding on either the consumers who are parties to the
actions or on those who have concluded a contract with that seller or supplier to
which the same terms apply.67 To ensure the deterrent nature and dissuasive
purpose of an action for an injunction, such actions may be brought even though
the terms which it is sought to have prohibited have not been used in specific
contracts.68 The national courts are required, of their own motion, and also as
regards the future, to draw all the consequences provided for by national law in
order to ensure that consumers who have concluded a contract to which those
terms apply will not be bound by that term.69 Other types of adequate and
effective penalties in national legislation are not excluded.70 Advocate-General
Trstenjak pointed out that the legal recognition of a right to refund of costs and
expenses charged by the service provider on the basis of unfair terms meets the
requirements for the authorisation granted under Article 8 of the Directive to be
exercised in accordance with EU law.71
cc) Integration in the case-law
The preliminary reference by the Hungarian court offered the CJEU for the first
time the possibility to take a position on the legal protection system of Directive
93/13/EEC and to clarify the relationship between individual and collective legal
actions.72 The erga omnes effect of a finding of unfairness on individual contracts
65 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 26.
66 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 30.
67 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 38.
68 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 37.
69 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraphs 41–43.
70 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 40.
71 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 6.12.2011 – case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraphs 74–76.
72 R. Mathiak, case note, (2012) 20 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 786, 789; see also
B. Keirsbilck, ‘The erga omnes effect of the finding of an unfair contract term: Nemzeti’ (2013) 5
CommonMarket Law Review 1467.
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corresponds to the effet utile of the Directive. It remains unclear whether the erga
omnes effect applies to every other seller or supplier using a similar term but not
involved in the proceedings that led to the finding that the term in question was
not binding. The Advocate-General replied in the negative in order to protect the
right to be heard of persons who are not party to the proceedings.73 The CJEU
takes no position on this issue, but does refer to the opinion of the Advocate-
General.74 However, the open wording of the CJEU in paragraph 40 might lead to
the conclusion that it is possible to extend the non-binding nature of the unfair
term to every other seller or supplier using a similar term.75
g) Power of the national court in an order for payment procedure, to determine,
of its own motion and in limine litis, that a term is unfair and should be
modified (Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona asked the CJEU to clarify whether
a national court before which an application for an order for payment has been
brought must assess of its own motion, in limine litis or at any other stage during
the proceedings, whether a term relating to interest on late payments contained
in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, in
the case where that consumer has not lodged an objection. The second question
was whether Article 6(1) of the Directive precludes a national rule that allows the
court to modify the contract by revising the content of that term.
In the dispute at hand, the consumer entered into a loan agreement for the
purchase of a vehicle. Due to a delay in the consumer’s repayments, Banesto
submitted an application in court for an order for payment for the outstanding
monthly installments due under the contract together with interest and costs. The
Spanish court ruled that the term concerning interest on late payments was void
and reduced the interest from 29% to 19%. The preliminary reference was made in
the context of the appeal by Banesto against that order claiming that the court
may not assess the agreed rate of interest on late payments of its own motion in
limine litis, but only after an objection to that effect has been lodged by the
defendant.
73 AG Trstenjak, n 71 above, paragraph 60.
74 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 39.
75 Reich and Micklitz, n 47 above, 261; on this point, see also M. Bottino, case note, (2012) 3
Revue européenne de droit de la consommation 587, 590.
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bb) Main reasoning
The case at hand should be distinguished from the cases Pannon GSM76 and VB
Pénzügyi Lízing77 inasmuch as it concerns the tasks of the national court in the
context of an order for payment procedure before the consumer has lodged an
objection.78 Given that national mechanisms for recovery of uncontested claims
are not harmonised, the CJEU refers to the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness.79 The CJEU found no evidence of a breach of the principle of equivalence.80
However, the effectiveness of the protection intended by the Directive is liable to
be undermined where the court may not assess of its own motion, in limine litis or
at any other stage, whether terms contained in a contract are unfair where that
consumer has not lodged an objection even though it already has all the legal and
factual elements necessary for that task. To test the principle of effectiveness, the
Court took into account the overall design of the Spanish procedure, such as the
opposition period of 20 days, the fact that the assistance of a lawyer is required in
cases exceeding a value of EUR 900, and the incomplete nature of the information
on the application available to consumers.81 The CJEU did not follow the opinion
of Advocate-General Trstenjak. The Advocate-General concurred with the unan-
imously held view of all the parties that it was sufficient for the consumer in
respect of whom an application for an order for payment has been made to be
given the opportunity to make a legal challenge by bringing an appeal.82
The CJEU held that the power of the national court to modify the content of an
unfair term is not compatible with Article 6(1) of the Directive.83 As pointed out by
Advocate-General Trstenjak, the modification of the unfair term in accordance
with the law could in fact give the seller or supplier an incentive simply to ‘try his
luck’ and to include as many unfair terms as possible in the agreement in the
hope that most of them will be overlooked by the national court.84
76 Case 243/08, n 2 above.
77 Case 137/08, n 41 above.
78 Case 618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino 14.6.2012 (CJEU), para-
graph 45; discussed by P. Rott, (2012) 4 European Review of Contract Law 470.
79 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraph 46.
80 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraphs 47, 48.
81 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraphs 49–57.
82 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 14.2.2012 – case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraph 74.
83 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraphs 65–73.
84 AG Trstenjak, n 82 above, paragraphs 86–88.
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cc) Integration in the case-law
According to Advocate-General Trestenjak, ‘the imposition of a duty to undertake
a thorough investigation in the context of the order for payment procedure and to
give a ruling in limine litis […] would result in a fundamental modification of the
operation of that procedure, which would eliminate an important efficiency
benefit of the order for payment procedure, namely the quick enforcement of
uncontested pecuniary claims.’85 The CJEU emphasized, however, that the control
must be present so as to prevent sellers or suppliers from initiating an order for
payment procedure instead of an ordinary civil procedure in order to deprive
consumers of the benefit of the protection intended by the Directive.86 Since the
risk of circumvention is implicit in any terms and conditions, it could be assumed
that this part of the judgment is not limited to terms concerning interest on late
payments. In accordance with the broader regulatory function of the Directive 93/
13/EEC, namely to prevent the continued application of unfair terms in consumer
contracts, the CJEU clarified that the national court has to disapply the unfair
contract term in its entirety and is not allowed to reduce the content to what is just
fair.87 This result could have broad consequences, particularly for the practice of
German courts.88
85 AG Trstenjak, n 82 above, paragraph 56; for an integration of this ruling in the light of Pannon
and VB Penzugyi Lizing and the ex officio investigation of the legal and factual elements necessary
for the examination of a term, see V. Trstenjak, ‘Procedural Aspects of European Consumer
Protection Law and the Case Law of the CJEU’ (2013) 2 European Review of Private 451.
86 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraph 55; concurring Rott, n 78 above, 472–475.
87 Rott, n 78 above, 475–477.
88 The CJEU explicitly rejected the validity-preserving reduction (geltungserhaltende Reduktion)
of unfair terms, which corresponds to the German approach. However, it is still unclear whether
the gap left by an invalid clause may be closed by a supplementary interpretation of the contract
(ergänzende Vertragsauslegung). In the Tagespreisklausel-decision (BGHZ 90, 69, 75, Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift 1984, 1177, 1778) from 1984, the German Federal Court of Justice annulled,
with the help of this legal construction, the potential effects of an invalid contract clause. Micklitz
and Reich see this as a possible violation of Article 6(1) of the Directive, since the supplementary
interpretation of the contract gets around the Community law prohibition of the validity-preser-
ving reduction, see H.-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘Luxemburg ante portas – jetzt auch im
deutschen “runderneuerten” AGB-Recht?’, in W. Wurmnest et al (eds), Festschrift für Ulrich
Magnus (forthcoming 2014).
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h) Obligation on the national court to invite the parties to submit their observa-
tions on its finding of an unfair term (Case C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank)
aa) Facts
The Hungarian Fővárosi Biróság asked the CJEU whether Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of
the Directive must be interpreted as precluding or, on the contrary, allowing the
national court which has held, of its own motion, that a contractual term is unfair
to inform the parties that it has found that there are grounds for invalidity and to
invite them to submit a statement in that regard. It also asked whether, when
examining an unfair contract term, it is permissible for the court to examine all
the terms of the contract, or only the terms on which the party concluding the
contract with the consumer bases his claim.
The consumer ceased fulfilling his obligation to make repayments under his
credit agreement, whereupon the Banif Plus Bank terminated the contract. The
pre-formulated credit agreement provided that, if that agreement were to be
terminated early due to breach of contract by the borrower, the borrower would
be obliged to pay the sum total of all outstanding instalments, default interest
and costs. The instalments payable included interest on the transaction and an
insurance fee, in addition to the capital amount. The Pesti Központi kerületi
bíróság, in its capacity as a court of first instance, informed the parties that it took
the view that the clause was unfair and invited the parties to comment on that
matter. The court ordered the consumer to pay the amount that was calculated
without application of the disputed clause. The Banif Plus Bank appealed against
that decision.
bb) Main reasoning
The full effectiveness of the protection provided for by the Directive requires that
‘the national court which has found of its own motion that a term is unfair should
be able to establish all the consequences of that finding, without waiting for the
consumer, who has been fully informed of his rights, to submit a statement
requesting that that term be declared invalid.”89 However, the national court must
take into account the requirements of effective judicial protection under Article 47
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These requirements
include the principle of audi alteram partem. The national court is, following an
assessment made of its own motion that that term is unfair, as a ‘general rule’
89 Case 472/11 Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csaba Csipai and Viktória Csipai 21.2.2013 (CJEU), paragraph
28.
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required to inform the parties to the dispute of that fact and to invite each of them
to set out their views on that matter, with the opportunity to challenge the views
of the other party, in accordance with the formal requirements laid down in that
regard by the national rules of procedure.90 As Asturcom Telecomunicaciones91
highlighted, this principle must be applied by taking into account, inter alia, the
basic principles of the domestic judicial system.92 The national court may, where
appropriate, take into account the will of the consumer when, conscious of the
non-binding nature of an unfair term, that consumer states nevertheless that he is
opposed to that term being disregarded, thus giving his free and informed consent
to the term in question.93 Regarding the second question, the CJEU refers to Article
3(1) and Article 4(1) of the Directive and states that the national court must take
account of all of the other terms of the contract in order to determine the unfair-
ness of the contractual term on which the claim is based.94
cc) Integration in the case-law
With regard to its case-law in Pannon GSM,95 the CJEU clarified that the national
court is not only entitled, but is obliged, to inform the consumer of the unfairness
of the clause and, where appropriate, to take into account the will of the con-
sumer to apply the unfair clause. The reference in paragraph 24 to VB Pénzügyi
Lízing,96 whereby the national court must investigate of its own motion whether a
term falls within the scope of the Directive, suggests that this obligation applies
not only to clauses that confer territorial jurisdiction, but also to clauses on the
substantive nature of the contract. In VB Pénzügyi Lízing, on the basis of the
national procedural autonomy, Advocate-General Trstenjak had refused to set
aside the evidential principle, according to which it is up to the parties to submit
all the relevant facts.97
90 Case 472/11, n 89 above, paragraphs 29–31. Referring to its case-law in case 89/08 P Commis-
sion v Ireland and Others [2009] ECR I-11245 (CJEU), paragraphs 50, 54.
91 Case 40/08, n 16 above, paragraph 39.
92 Case 472/11, n 89 above, paragraph 33.
93 Case 472/11, n 89 above, paragraph 35.
94 Case 472/11, n 89 above, paragraphs 40, 41.
95 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraph 33.
96 Case 137/08, n 41 above, paragraph 56.
97 AG Trstenjak, n 46 above, paragraphs 109 et seq.
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i) Possibilities for legal protection in mortgage enforcement proceedings; Cri-
teria for assessing unfairness (Case C-415/11 Aziz)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Juzgado de lo Mercantil n° 3 de Barcelona asked the CJEU about the
compatibility of the Spanish mortgage enforcement proceedings with Directive
93/13/EEC. According to the Spanish Civil Procedure Code, the debtor may not
object to the unfairness of a term of the loan agreement in the mortgage enforce-
ment proceedings. An objection to an unfair term is only possible in separate
declaratory proceedings which do not lead to a suspension of the enforcement
proceedings. The Spanish court also asked for the criteria for assessing the fair-
ness of three specific clauses concerning acceleration in long-term contracts,
setting of default interest rates, and the agreement on quantification.
In the case at hand a consumer concluded a loan agreement with the defen-
dant bank in order to finance his own home and created a mortgage to secure that
loan. The immovable property subject to the mortgage was the consumer’s family
home. The consumer stopped making payments and, having called in vain upon
him to pay, the bank instituted enforcement proceedings of the notarial instru-
ment attesting the debt against him before the Juzgado de Primera Instancia n° 5
de Martorell. After completion of the enforcement proceedings, the consumer
applied to the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n° 3 de Barcelona for a declaration seeking
the annulment of a clause of the mortgage loan agreement, on the ground that it
was unfair and, accordingly, of the enforcement proceedings.
bb) Main reasoning
The national mechanisms for enforcement and the rules implementing the
grounds of objection allowed in mortgage enforcement proceedings are subject to
the Member States’ procedural autonomy, limited by the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness.98 In the Spanish procedural law, the final vesting of mortgaged
property in a third party is always irreversible, even if the unfairness of the term
results in the annulment of the mortgage enforcement proceedings, except where
that consumer made a preliminary registration of the application for annulment
of the mortgage before the marginal note regarding issue of the security certifi-
cate.99 However, there is a significant risk that the consumer will not make that
98 Case 415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunya-
caixa) 14.3.2013 (CJEU), paragraph 50.
99 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraphs 54–57.
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preliminary registration within the period prescribed for that purpose, ‘either
because of the rapidity of the enforcement proceedings in question or because he
is unaware of or does not appreciate the extent of his rights.’100 If enforcement in
respect of the mortgaged immovable property took place before the judgment of
the court in the declaratory proceedings declaring unfair the contractual term on
which the mortgage is based and annulling the enforcement proceedings, that
judgment would enable that consumer to obtain only subsequent protection of a
purely compensatory nature. This would be incomplete and insufficient and
would not constitute either an adequate or effective means of preventing the
continued use of that term, contrary to Article 7(1).101 The CJEU considers the
Spanish legislation to infringe the principle of effectiveness, especially because
that means of consumer protection is limited to payment of damages and interest
and does not make it possible to prevent the definitive and irreversible loss of the
consumer’s dwelling.102 Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion concluded that the
principle of effectiveness requires that the court hearing the declaratory proceed-
ings has the possibility of staying the enforcement proceedings (provisionally) in
order to stop enforcement until it has been assessed whether a term is unfair.103
The CJEU, referring to Unibet,104 confirmed the view of the Advocate-General.105
In order to ascertain whether a term causes a ‘significant imbalance’ in the
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the
consumer, it must in particular be considered what rules of national law would
apply in the absence of an agreement by the parties in that regard.106 Such an
imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, if the seller or
supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could not reasonably
assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual
contract negotiations.107 Referring to the opinion of Advocate-General Kokott, the
CJEU explained the evaluation criteria for the specific clauses of the mortgage
loan agreement:
Regarding the term concerning acceleration, in long-term contracts, on ac-
count of events of default occurring within a limited specific period, it held that
100 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 58.
101 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 60.
102 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 61.
103 AGKokott, opinion of 8.11.2012 – case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 57.
104 Case 432/05 Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekansler [2007] ECR
I-2271, paragraph 77.
105 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 59.
106 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 68.
107 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 69.
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the national court must assess ‘whether the right of the seller or supplier to call in
the totality of the loan is conditional upon the non-compliance by the consumer
with anobligationwhich is of essential importance in the context of the contractual
relationship in question, whether that right is provided for in cases in which such
non-compliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount of the
loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant applicable rules and whether
national law provides for adequate and effective means enabling the consumer
subject to such a term to remedy the effects of the loan being called in’.108
Regarding the term concerning the fixing of default interest, the CJEU held
that in light of point 1(e) of the Annex to the Directive, in conjunction with Articles
3(1) and 4(1), the national court must assess, ‘first, the rules of national law which
would apply to the relationship between the parties, in the event of no agreement
having been reached in the contract in question or in other consumer contracts of
that type and, second, the rate of default interest laid down, compared with the
statutory interest rate, in order to determine whether it is appropriate for securing
the attainment of the objectives pursued by it in the Member State concerned and
does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them’.109
Regarding the term concerning the unilateral determination by the lender of
the amount of the unpaid debt, the CJEU held that taking into account point 1(q)
of the Annex to the Directive and the criteria contained in Articles 3(1) and
4(1) thereof, the referring court must assess whether and, if appropriate, to what
extent ‘the term in question derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of
agreement between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the consumer,
given the procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action and exercise
rights of the defence’.110
cc) Integration in the case-law
In Aziz the CJEU encountered the social implications of the euro crisis. Neither the
Advocate-General nor the Court speak of the right to housing in accordance with
Article 34(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly, although it repeat-
edly appears in the reasoning. Aziz affects not only the Spanish consumers. This
108 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 73; with reference to AG Kokott, n 103 above, paragraphs
77, 78.
109 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 74; with reference to AG Kokott, n 103 above, paragraphs
85–87.
110 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 75; the CJEU does not refer to the opinion of the
Advocate-General, who establishes more detailed criteria for the assessment; see AG Kokott,
n 103 above, paragraphs 89–95.
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is a classic case of a ‘public interest litigation’. The CJEU occurs as a political
actor, who uses the law to compensate for the negative effects of the euro crisis.111
In Aziz, the CJEU did not take on the question whether the consumer in the
context of enforcement proceedings needs to have the opportunity to raise the
unfairness of clauses. However, it goes into the matter to the relationship between
mortgage enforcement procedures and declaratory proceedings.112 The CJEU es-
tablished a new remedy, which connects the enforcement proceedings with the
declaratory proceedings. The court in the declaratory proceedings must have the
power to order an interim stay of the enforcement proceedings. The case differs
from VB Pénzügyi Lízing113 and Banco Español de Crédito,114 which dealt with the
duties of national courts to carry out an assessment of the unfairness of contract
terms of their own motion.115 Nevertheless, the question of the courts’ assessment
of the unfairness of contract terms of its own motion remained open in Aziz. How
can it be ensured that the consumer receives the protection of his rights despite
being ignorant of the unfair term?116
In Aziz, the CJEU confirmed that it had found a middle ground between a
comprehensive control competence in Océano Grupo117 and the lack of control
competence as in Freiburger Kommunalbauten.118 The CJEU has gradually concre-
tized the abstract criteria to be used for assessing clauses and clearly restricts the
scope of the national courts. In Aziz, the CJEU interpreted for the first time the
criterion of ‘imbalance’ and the requirement of ‘good faith’. The CJEU gives the
dispositive law a model function within the assessment of terms.119 Advocate-
General Kokott and the CJEU reject an abstract and general substantive control
and require instead a concrete assessment based on the circumstances of the
case.120 The CJEU points to subjective criteria: whether the consumer had con-
sented to the clause in individual negotiations and whether the trader, dealing
fairly and equitably, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have
agreed to a particular term. The CJEU does not address the relationship of the
111 H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Theme VIII. Unfair Contract Terms – Public Interest Litigation before Eur-
opean Courts’, in E. Terryn, G. Straetmans and V. Colaert (eds), Landmark Cases of EU Consumer
Law – In honour of Jules Stuyck (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2013) 633.
112 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraphs 37–39.
113 Case 137/08, n 41 above.
114 Case 618/10, n 78 above.
115 Case 415/11, n 98 above, paragraph 49.
116 Micklitz, n 111 above.
117 Joined cases 240/98 to 244/98, n 7 above.
118 Case 237/02, n 8 above.
119 M. Ebers, case note, (2013) 5 LMKAnmerkung, 345483.
120 Micklitz, n 111 above.
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requirement of ‘good faith’ to the criterion of ‘imbalance’.121 In line with the
utilisation of the Annex in VB Pénzügyi Lízing122 and Invitel,123 the CJEU also uses
the Annex in Aziz to concretise the criteria for the assessment of terms.124
j) Assessment of price increase terms in gas supply contracts;
Transparency as information requirement (Case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb)
aa) Facts
The German Bundesgerichtshof asked whether Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC
is to be interpreted as meaning that contractual terms concerning price variations
in gas supply contracts with consumers who are to be supplied outside the
general obligation to supply gas are not subject to the provisions of the Directive
if, in those contractual terms, the statutory provisions which apply to standard
tariff customers within the framework of the general obligation to provide gas
(AVBGasV) are incorporated unchanged. In addition, the German Federal Court
of Justice sought clarification as to whether, in light of Articles 3 and 5 of Directive
93/13/EEC in conjunction with point 1(j) and 2(b) of the Annex thereof and Article
3(3) of Directive 2003/55 in conjunction with points (b) and/or (c) of Annex A
thereof, contractual terms meet the requirements for plain and intelligible word-
ing and transparency if, although the grounds, conditions and scope of a change
in price are not set out, the gas supply company informs its customers of every
price increase in good time in advance and customers have the right to terminate
the contract.
In the national proceedings, a consumer organisation, under rights assigned
by 25 consumers, claimed from the energy supply undertaking RWE reimburse-
ment of the additional amounts paid to it by those consumers following price
increases. RWE had made the price increases in the years 2003 to 2005 based on
contractual gas price change clauses that refer to or contain provisions identical
to the national legal regulation of obligatory gas supply. The legislation allowed
the supplier to vary gas prices unilaterally without stating the grounds, condi-
tions or scope of the variation, while ensuring, however, that customers would be
informed of the variation and would if appropriate be free to terminate the
contract. However, the national legislation, did not apply to those special con-
tracts and governed standard tariff contracts only.
121 Ebers, n 119 above.
122 Case 137/08, n 41 above.
123 Case 472/10, n 63 above.
124 Micklitz, n 111 above.
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bb) Main reasoning
The exclusion in Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC of contractual clauses which
are based on ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ is justified by the fact
that it may legitimately be supposed that the national legislature struck a balance
between all the rights and obligations of the parties to certain contracts.125 An
intention of the parties to extend the application of those rules to a different
contract cannot be equated to the establishment by the national legislature of a
balance between all the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract.126
Otherwise, a supplier could easily avoid review of the unfairness of terms not
individually negotiated with a consumer by drafting the terms in his contracts in
the same way as those laid down by national legislation for certain categories of
contracts.127 The German legislature chose to exclude the special contracts from
the scope of the AVBGasV.128 In accordance with the views of the Commission and
Advocate-General Trstenjak, Directive 93/13/EEC applies to general terms and
conditions, incorporated into contracts concluded between a supplier and a
consumer, which reproduce a rule of national law applicable to another category
of contracts.129
Although in Directives 93/13/EEC and 2003/55/EC the European legislature
recognised, in the context of contracts of indeterminate length such as contracts
for the supply of gas, the existence of a legitimate interest of the supplier in being
able to alter the charge for its service, a high level of consumer protection must be
ensured.130 To assess whether the gas price variation clause meets the require-
ments in Article 3 and Article 5 of Directive 93/13/EEC, it must be examined in
terms of Invitel131 especially, ‘whether the contract sets out in transparent fashion
the reason for and method of the variation of the charges for the service to be
provided, so that the consumer can foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible
criteria, the alterations that may be made to those charges and, secondly, whether
consumers have the right to terminate the contract if the charges are in fact
altered’.132 The lack of information on the point before the contract is concluded
cannot, in principle, be compensated for by the mere fact that consumers will,
125 Case 92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV 21.3.2013 (CJEU),
paragraph 28.
126 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 29.
127 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 31.
128 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraphs 33–37.
129 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraphs 38, 39.
130 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraphs 45–47.
131 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 30.
132 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 49.
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during the performance of the contract, be informed in good time of a variation of
the charges and of their right to terminate the contract.133 It is of fundamental
importance that the right of termination given to the consumer is not purely
formal but can actually be exercised.134 This amounts to a balancing of the
interests of the two parties, because ‘[t]o the supplier’s legitimate interest in
guarding against a change of circumstances there corresponds the consumer’s
equally legitimate interest, first, in knowing and thus being able to foresee the
consequences which such a change might in future have for him and, secondly,
in having the data available in such a case to allow him to react most appropri-
ately to his new situation’.135 It is for the national court to carry out the assessment
of the gas price variation clause with regard to all the circumstances of the
particular case, including all the general terms and conditions of the consumer
contracts of which the term at issue forms part.136 At the request of the German
Government and RWE to limit the temporal effect of the judgment, the CJEU refers
to two essential criteria that must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be
imposed, namely that those concerned have acted in good faith and that there is a
risk of serious difficulties.137
cc) Integration in the case-law
The CJEU is getting further away from the declaration in Freiburger Kommunal-
bauten138 that the question of invalidity is not the competence of the CJEU but of
the national court. The detailed interpretation of the requirements in Article 3 and
Article 5 of Directive 93/13/EEC allows the national court little room not to discard
the gas price variation clause.139 The originally individualistic control of unfair
terms is turning into a Union specific market control.140 The CJEU turns the
transparency requirement into a positive information obligation as only clear and
transparent information allows the consumer to make use of his rights.141 On
31.07.2013 the German Federal Court of Justice held, in the subsequent decision,
133 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 51.
134 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 54.
135 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 53.
136 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraph 55.
137 Case 92/11, n 125 above, paragraphs 59–62.
138 Case 237/02, n 8 above.
139 N. Reich and H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Von der Klausel- zur Marktkontrolle’ (2013) 12 Europäische
Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 457, 459.
140 Reich andMicklitz, n 139 above, 457.
141 Reich and Micklitz, n 139 above, 460. For a recent review of German courts’ approach to
unilateral price variations by gas supply undertakings, see: P. Rott, ‘The Adjustment of Long-
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that the price variation clauses used by RWE in special contracts that adopt, or
refer to, the rules contained in the AVBGasV are invalid.142 A collective system for
the settlement of recoveries would simplify the rescission. The case law of the
CJEU is moving gradually towards that goal.143
k) Application of Directive 93/13/EEC to a residential tenancy agreement;
judicial power to mitigate unfair terms (Case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse and
de Man Garabito)
aa) Facts
The Gerechtshof te Amsterdam asked the CJEU whether a tenancy agreement
between a person who leases out residential premises on a commercial basis and
a person who rents such premises on a non-commercial basis falls within the
scope of Directive 93/13/EEC. Also, it asked whether the fact that the provisions of
the Directive are of equal standing to national rules of public policy means that
the national court is obliged to assess of its own motion a contractual term and to
find that term to be void if it is unfair. In its third question, the national court
wanted to know whether it is compatible with Article 6 that the national court
does not refrain from applying an unfair contractual penalty clause but merely
mitigates the amount of the penalty instead.
In the case at hand, a company letting residential property on a commercial
basis rented premises to a couple who were acting on a non-commercial basis.
The terms and conditions of the lease stipulated that the tenant has to pay a
penalty in case of late payment. Since the tenant did not comply with their
payments, they were sued before the Rechtbank Alkmaar. The tenants appealed
and requested that the amounts granted by way of penalties were reduced, having
regard to the discrepancy between, on the one hand, those sums, and, on the
other, the detriment suffered by the landlord.
bb) Main reasoning
The Directive is applicable to a tenancy agreement between a person who lets
residential premises on a commercial basis and a person who rents such premises
on a non-commercial basis. The European legislature’s intention was not to
Term Supply Contracts: Experience from German Gas Price Case Law’ (2013) 3 European Review of
Private Law 717.
142 VIII ZR 162/09.
143 Reich andMicklitz, n 139 above, 460, andmore in depth, Micklitz and Reich, n 88 above.
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restrict the scope of the Directive solely to contracts concluded between a seller
and a consumer.144 The tenth recital in the preamble to the Directive clearly
indicates that the uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms should apply
to ‘all contracts’ concluded between sellers or suppliers and consumers, as
defined in Article 2(b) and (c) of the directive.145 The decisive factor is whether the
parties are acting for purposes relating to their trade, business or profession.146
Consumer protection is of special importance in a tenancy agreement. The in-
equality between the parties is aggravated by ‘the fact that, from an economic
perspective, such a contract relates to an essential need of the consumer, namely
to obtain lodging, and involves sums which most frequently, for the tenant,
represent one of the most significant items in his budget, while, from a legal
perspective, this is a contract which, as a general rule, is covered by complex
national rules about which individuals are often poorly informed.’147
Due to lack of Union legislation in the area, the CJEU noted that the procedur-
al rules governing appeal proceedings seeking to safeguard the rights that indivi-
duals derive from European Union law fall within the internal legal order of the
Member States by virtue of the principle of national procedural autonomy.148
According to the principle of equivalence, where the national court has the power
to examine of its own motion the validity of a legal measure in the light of
national rules of public policy, it must also exercise that power in the light of the
criteria laid down in the Directive to decide whether a contractual term may be
unfair.149 It follows that, where the national court has the power to annul of its
own motion a term which is contrary to public policy or a mandatory statutory
provision, it must also annul of its own motion a contractual term which is unfair
under the Directive.150 However, the national court must inform the parties to the
dispute of the finding of unfairness and invite each of them to set out its views on
that matter, with the opportunity to challenge the views of the other party.151
Point 1(e) of the Annex to the Directive mentions, among the terms which
may be declared unfair within the meaning of the Directive, terms which have the
object or effect of requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a
144 Case 488/11 Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV 30.5.2013
(CJEU), paragraph 28.
145 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 29.
146 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 30.
147 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 32.
148 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 42.
149 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 45.
150 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 51.
151 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 52.
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disproportionately high sum in compensation. As highlighted in Invitel152 the
content of the Annex is an ‘essential element’ on which the competent court may
base its assessment as to the unfair nature of that term.153 Referring to its case-law
in Banco Español de Crédito154 the CJEU emphasizes that under Article 6(1)
national courts are required to exclude the application of an unfair contractual
term, without being authorised to revise the content of that term.155
cc) Integration in the case-law
The CJEU affirmed the application of Directive 93/13/EEC to pre-formulated
tenancy agreements between a commercial landlord and a non-commercial
tenant. The Dutch version of Article 1(1) sets out that the purpose of the Directive
is to harmonize national rules on unfair terms in contracts concluded between a
‘seller’ (‘verkoper’) and a consumer. Most other language versions use an expres-
sion which is wider in scope to designate the other party to the contract with the
consumer. The English version uses the terms ‘seller or supplier’.156 In addition,
the CJEU confirmed its ruling in Banco Español de Crédito. It declared the mitiga-
tion of an excessive penalty based on an unfair contractual clause under Dutch
law to be incompatible with Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC.
l) The national court’s obligation to examine, of its own motion, whether a
contractual term is unfair in appeal proceedings (Case C-397/11 Jőrös)
aa) Facts
The Hungarian Fővárosi Bíróság asked the CJEU whether a national court, before
which appeal proceedings have been brought concerning the validity of terms in
a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, is entitled to
examine the unfair nature of the terms at issue if that ground for invalidity was
not raised in the proceedings at first instance and new facts or evidence cannot
generally be taken into consideration in appeal proceedings under national law.
The consumer concluded a credit contract with a Hungarian financial institu-
tion. The consumer argued that the credit contract was partially invalid, but did
not refer to the unfairness of a contractual term. The court of first instance
152 Case 472/10, n 63 above, paragraph 26.
153 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 55.
154 Case 618/10, n 78 above, paragraphs 65–69.
155 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraphs 57–59.
156 Case 488/11, n 144 above, paragraph 25.
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dismissed the action. The consumer lodged an appeal against the judgment and
claimed that certain clauses of the credit contract were invalid as they were
manifestly contrary to ethical practice in that they allowed the creditor unilater-
ally to amend the contract terms and obliged the debtor to bear the burden of the
consequences of those amendments.
bb) Main reasoning
Based on the principle of procedural autonomy, it is for the Member States to lay
down the procedural rules governing appeal proceedings for safeguarding the
rights that individuals derive from European Union law.157 According to the
principle of equivalence, where the national court ruling in appeal proceedings
has a discretion or the obligation to examine of its own motion the validity of a
legal measure in the light of national rules of public policy, even though no
conflict in that area was raised at first instance, it must also exercise such a power
for the purposes of assessing, of its own motion, in the light of the criteria in
Directive 93/13, whether a contractual term falling within the scope of application
of that Directive is unfair.158 The Hungarian procedural law complies with the
principle of effectiveness, in so far that a court ruling in appeal proceedings has
jurisdiction, as soon as it has available to it the legal or factual elements neces-
sary for that task, to assess, of its own motion or by redefining the legal basis of
the application, whether those elements point to grounds for invalidity of a
contractual term, even where the party to the proceedings which could have
argued that the term was invalid on the basis of those elements did not do so.159
As noted already in Banif Plus Bank,160 the national court is required, without
waiting for a request of the consumer, to establish all the consequences, arising
under national law, of a finding that the term in question is unfair in order to
ensure that the consumer is not bound by that term.161 As national law must be
interpreted in accordance with Directive 93/13 so that the rights of consumers are
effectively protected, it follows that national courts must apply, as far as possible,
their internal procedural rules in such a way as to achieve the result laid down by
Article 6(1) of the Directive.162 To assess whether the contract actually can exist
without the clause in question, objective criteria are, in principle, decisive.
157 Case 397/11 Erika Jőrös vAegonMagyarország Hitel Zrt 30.5.2013 (CJEU), paragraph 29.
158 Case 397/11, n 157 above, paragraph 30.
159 Case 397/11, n 157 above, paragraphs 35, 37.
160 Case 472/11, n 89 above, paragraphs 27, 28.
161 Case 397/11, n 157 above, paragraphs 41, 42.
162 Case 397/11, n 157 above, paragraph 51.
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According to Pereničová163 there is the possibility of declaring a consumer contract
containing one or more unfair terms invalid as a whole where that will ensure
better protection of the consumer.164
cc) Integration in the case-law
Gradually the case-law approaches the problem of what exactly the legal conse-
quences of Article 6 should be. The Directive says that unfair terms shall ‘not be
binding’ on consumers. This category should only arise in a few cases. Clauses
can be ineffective, in part or in whole, or void. The Hungarian court here ob-
viously wanted to clarify this, but it has not been achieved. Sooner or later, the
CJEU should also respond to this set of questions.
m) Territorial jurisdiction for an action for an injunction brought by
a regional consumer protection association (Case C-413/12
Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León)
aa) Facts
The reference for a preliminary ruling from the Spanish Audiencia Provincial de
Salamanca concerned the question, whether EU law precludes national procedur-
al rules under which an action for an injunction initiated by a consumer protec-
tion association must be brought before the courts where the defendant is estab-
lished or has its address and whereby no appeal lies against a decision declining
territorial jurisdiction.
The Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León (ACICL)
is a regional consumer protection association, whose remit is limited to the
territory Castile-León and who has its registered office in Salamanca. ACICL
brought an action for an injunction against a company having its registered office
in Barcelona before the first instance court in Salamanca. It sought to prevent the
continued use of certain alleged unfair terms of the general conditions governing
the use of that company’s website. The first instance court declined its jurisdiction
on the ground that Spanish procedural law confers jurisdiction to hear actions for
injunctions brought to protect the consumers’ collective interest to the court
where the defendant is established or has its address. Although the Spanish
procedural rules do not provide for such a remedy, ACICL brought an appeal
163 Case 453/10, n 50 above, paragraph 35.
164 Case 397/11, n 157 above, paragraph 47.
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before the Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca against the decision declining
jurisdiction.
bb) Main reasoning
As EU law does not lay down rules attributing territorial jurisdiction for actions
for an injunction for the protection of the consumers’ interest or regulating the
number of instances of jurisdiction in relation to decisions declining territorial
jurisdiction in such circumstances, the CJEU held that those rules are governed by
the principle of procedural autonomy to the extent that they comply with the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness.165 The CJEU did not find any evidence
for a breach of the principle of equivalence and concluded in line with the opinion
of Advocate-General Mengozzi that the Spanish procedural rules comply with the
principle of effectiveness. The particular financial situation of ACICL, which may
render it impossible for ACICL to initiate an action before the court where the
defendant has its registered office, is irrelevant. The general interest in the sound
administration of justice and foreseeability prevails over the individual interest.166
The CJEU grounds its decision on four specific aspects of the Spanish procedural
system: Firstly, the court designated by the court which declined jurisdiction may
not question its own territorial jurisdiction.167 Secondly, ACICL is not required to
be present before court at all stages of the proceedings.168 Thirdly, the financial
difficulties of ACICL may be overcome by other mechanisms as legal aid or a
waiver of security.169 Fourthly, the Spanish procedural rules aim to avoid contra-
dictory judicial rulings and thereby contribute to legal certainty.170
In response to the submission by the Spanish court, the CJEU made clear that
its interpretation of the Brussels Convention in Henkel,171 where it found that the
efficacy for actions for an injunction under Article 7 of Directive 93/13 would be
considerably diminished if those actions could be brought only in the State where
the trader is domiciled, applies only in the cross-border context and cannot be
transposed to the circumstances at hand.172 The CJEU also rejected to extend the
165 Case 413/12 Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León v Anuntis Segun-
damano España SL 5.12.2013 (CJEU), paragraphs 28–30.
166 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraphs 37 and 38.
167 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraph 40.
168 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraph 41.
169 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraphs 42 and 43.
170 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraph 45.
171 Case 167/00 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel [2002] ECR I-08111
(CJEU), paragraph 43.
172 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraphs 46 and 47.
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preferential procedural treatment granted to individual consumers to consumer
associations for the purpose of Directive 93/13: An action for an injunction
initiated by a consumer protection association is not characterized by the same
imbalance that is present in an individual action brought by a consumer against a
seller or supplier.173
cc) Integration in the case-law
In Asociación de Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León, the CJEU
deprived consumer protection associations of the possibility to initiate actions for
an injunction at the place of their main office. The CJEU followed Advocate-
General Mengozzi in drawing a clear distinction between individual cases, where
the consumer is the weaker party and has to be protected, and collective actions
initiated by consumer protection associations, where no need for protection
exists. This distinction is debatable as consumer protection associations often do
not have the same level of resources and competence as businesses. The answer
of the CJEU could be different if the procedure was a cross-border one.
n) Compatibility of an out-of-court settlement procedure of a secured claim by
recourse to the public auction of immovable property with Directive 93/13/
EEC (Case C-482/12 Macinský and Macinská)
aa) Facts
The Slovak Okresný súd Prešov asked the CJEU whether the Slovak rules enabling
a creditor to enforce a secured claim based on an unfair term in a consumer
contract through the sale of immovable property by means of an out-of-court
procedure are compatible with Directive 93/13/EEC.
Mr and Mrs Macinský took out a loan secured by a property interest over their
home from Financreal s r o. When the debtors failed to pay the monthly instal-
ments, Financreal decided to take action against them and ceded its claim to
Getfin s r o, a debit recovery business. Getfin brought legal proceedings against
the debtors before the Okresný súd Prešov and engaged a private undertaking to
proceed with the enforcement of the security interest by extra-judicial means
through the sale of the apartment by public auction. The debtors successfully
applied to the Okresný súd Prešov for interim relief in order to suspend the out-of-
court enforcement proceedings. In the legal proceedings initiated by Getfin, the
173 Case 413/12, n 165 above, paragraphs 48–50.
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Okresný súd Prešov came to the conclusion that the interest rate specified in the
contract is morally unacceptable and, accordingly, the contract null and void. In
connection with the proceedings for interim relief, the Slovak court decided to
make a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
bb) Opinion of Advocate-General Wahl
Advocate-General Wahl considers that the question referred by the Slovak court
ought not to be admissible, as the answer will not have any impact on the
outcome of the case before the national court. The order of reference states that
the company which was engaged in order to enforce the claim has abandoned the
pursuit of a public auction. In addition, the judgment of the Slovak court, which
held that the loan agreement is null and void, has become final. The loan
agreement provides therefore no longer a legal basis for the procedure at issue.174
However, to anticipate the possibility that the CJEU might come to a different
conclusion, Advocate-General Wahl examined the substantive question of the
Slovak court.
Advocate-General Wahl concluded that the national procedure at issue pro-
vides to a sufficient degree for the effective protection of the rights of consumers
as required under Directive 93/13.175 He distilled from the case-law of the CJEU in
Banco Español de Crédito and Aziz that providing traders with recourse to a
special procedure is only in so far contrary to the principle of effectiveness as it
makes it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to apply the protection
which Directive 93/13 intends to confer on consumers.176 While the national
procedural rules must provide certain guarantees in order to protect the weaker
party, Advocate-General Wahl did not consider it excessive to require consumers
to initiate legal proceedings against the trader to suspend or halt the out-of-court
enforcement procedure in the form of a public auction.177
The specificities of the Slovak procedural and remedial system comply with
the principle of effectiveness. Before the public auction will take place, the debtor
is given at least 30 days from his notification to challenge the enforcement
procedure. After the sale of the property has taken place, the debtor has up to
three months to challenge the public auction. While the law obliges the debtor to
surrender the property after the sale without undue delay, the debtor can request
174 AG Wahl, opinion of 21.11.2013 – case 482/12 Peter Macinský, Eva Macinská v Getfin s r o,
Financreal s r o, paragraph 42.
175 AGWahl, n 174 above, paragraph 64.
176 AGWahl, n 174 above, paragraph 68.
177 AGWahl, n 174 above, paragraphs 69, 78.
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a court to suspend the procedure and the surrender of the property. Moreover, in
the case where the consumer has in fact surrendered his property, there is a
possibility of recovering that property if the public auction is annulled.178 Advo-
cate-General Wahl stresses that once a consumer has challenged a sale by public
auction, that challenge triggers the case-law of the CJEU on the responsibilities of
the national court to assess of its own motion whether a term is unfair and to
ensure that the consumer is not bound by an unfair term.179
cc) Integration in the case-law
As pointed out by Advocate-General Wahl, the Court must address an issue,
which it did not explicitly rule upon in Banco Español de Crédito180 or Aziz,181
namely whether it is compatible with Directive 93/13 for a Member State to require
consumers to make the first move to suspend or halt the enforcement of a contract
which allegedly contains an unfair term. It remains to be seen whether the CJEU
will follow the Advocate-General in confirming this question. What is amazing in
this opinion is the tone and the language in which the Advocate-General criticizes
the intransparency and incomprehensibility of the Slovak legal system.
o) The right of consumer protection associations to intervene in enforcement
proceedings of an arbitration award (Case C‑470/12 Pohotovost’)
aa) Facts
The Slovak Okresný súd Svidník asked the CJEU whether Directive 93/13 and
Articles 47 and 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
require or preclude granting consumer protection associations leave to intervene
in enforcement proceedings.
The Slovak consumer protection association HOOS applied to intervene in the
enforcement proceedings of an arbitration award against Mr Vašuta. The legal
proceedings arose out of the consumer credit agreement, which Mr Vašuta con-
cluded with Photovost’ s r o. HOOS appealed against the order of the Slovak court,
which denied to grant the consumer protection association leave to intervene in
the enforcement proceedings. HOOS claimed that the national court failed to
protect Mr Vašuta against an unfair arbitration clause of its own motion and
178 AGWahl, n 174 above, paragraphs 84–88.
179 AGWahl, n 174 above, paragraph 97.
180 Case 618/10, n 78 above.
181 Case 415/11, n 98 above.
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missed to draw all the consequences out of the omission to state the annual
percentage rate of charge in the consumer credit contract.
bb) Opinion of Advocate-General Wahl
The admissibility of the preliminary reference by the Slovak court is in question
as Photovost’withdrew its action for enforcement of the arbitration award against
Mr Vašuta. However, as the legal effects of the withdrawal of the action are
uncertain, Advocate-General Wahl proposes that the preliminary reference is
admissible.182 He thereby draws on the spirit of cooperation and trust between the
national courts and the CJEU in the preliminary ruling procedure, which must
prevail over the submission made by one of the parties to the dispute.183
Advocate-General Wahl concluded that Directive 93/13 and the principle of
effectiveness do not preclude a national procedural rule, which denies consumer
protection associations the right to intervene into legal proceedings between an
individual consumer and a seller or supplier. In order to reach this conclusion, he
clarified the different roles of the national courts and consumer protection asso-
ciations under the Directive. It is the duty of the national court to compensate for
the imbalance which exists between an individual consumer and a seller or
supplier by assessing of its own motion whether a contractual term falling within
the scope of Directive 93/13 is unfair and by ensuring that the consumer is not
bound by an unfair term. The intervention by the national court guarantees the
effective protection of the consumer against unfair terms.184 However, Directive
93/13 does not foresee a role for consumer protection associations in legal
proceedings between an individual consumer and a seller or supplier. The Direc-
tive requires that consumer protection associations, if regarded as having a
legitimate interest in the matter, have facilities for initiating proceeding against
unfair terms in their own right. Those measures have a deterrent nature and aim
to prevent the continued use of unfair terms independent from individual pro-
ceedings.185 However, as the Member States may adopt more stringent provisions
in the area covered by the Directive, they are not precluded to grant consumer
protection associations leave to intervene into legal proceedings. Such a measure
could enhance the level of consumer protection, particularly if the consumer
182 AGWahl, opinion of 12.12.2013 – case 470/12 Photovosť s r o vMiroslav Vašuta, paragraph 36.
183 AGWahl, n 182 above, paragraphs 37 and 38.
184 AGWahl, n 182 above, paragraphs 53–56.
185 AGWahl, n 182 above, paragraphs 59–62.
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protection associations inform the national court of certain terms, which were
considered to be unfair by other national courts.186
cc) Integration in the case-law
The case addresses the position of consumer protection associations under EU
law when it comes to assisting consumers in pursuing their claims in court. It
demonstrates how substantive and procedural law in the field of consumer
protection are inter-related. However, according to Advocate-General Wahl, the
question referred to the CJEU is neither directly nor indirectly governed by EU
law: This issue is said not to be addressed by Directive 93/13. Articles 38 and 47 of
the Charter do not support a different interpretation of the Directive in the sense
that it would provide for a right of consumer protection associations to intervene
in individual enforcement proceedings. The rather narrow reading does not seem
to be in line with the move the CJEU made in Aziz, in which the CJEU deduced
from secondary Community law a new remedy to ask for injunctive relief to hold
the enforcement procedure where the mortgage contract contains unfair contract
terms.187
2 Doorstep selling (Case C-227/08 Martín Martín;
case C-215/08 E. Friz; case C-166/11 González Alonso)
a) Legal consequences of the consumer’s lack of information on his right of
cancellation (Case C-227/08 Martín Martín)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Audiencia Provincial de Salamanca asked if, according to Article 4 of
Directive 85/577/EEC,188 a national court may raise, of its own motion, an infringe-
ment of that provision and declare the contract void on the ground that the
consumer was not informed of his right of cancellation. The consumer is required
under Spanish law to seek annulment of the contract where, upon its conclusion,
the requirement to inform the consumer of his right of cancellation has not been
met. Moreover, under the Spanish Law on Civil Procedure the principle that the
parties delimit the subject-matter of the proceedings applies, under which the
186 AGWahl, n 182 above, paragraphs 71 and 72.
187 Micklitz, n 111 above.
188 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of
contracts negotiated away from business premises,OJ 1985 L372/31.
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court cannot examine of its own motion facts, evidence and claims which the
parties have not invoked.
In the case at hand, the consumer concluded a contract in a doorstep
situation for the purchase of 15 books, five DVDs and a DVD player. Since the
goods had not been paid for, the company applied for an order for payment. The
referring court took the view that the contract could potentially be annulled
because the consumer was not properly informed about her right of cancellation.
The consumer, however, had not argued for the annulment of the contract.
bb) Main reasoning
Referring to the van Schijndel189 case, the CJEU made it clear that Community law
does not, in principle, require national courts to raise of their ownmotion an issue
concerning the breach of provisions of Community law, except in situations
where their intervention can be required in the public interest.190 Following
Hamilton191 and Heiniger,192 the Court emphasizes the obligation to give notice to
the consumer according to Article 4 of the Directive as an essential guarantee for
the effective exercise of the right of cancellation and a component of the public
interest. A positive intervention by the national court may be justified in order to
achieve a balance between the consumer and the trader in the case of off-
premises contracts. Therefore, the national court may determine of its ownmotion
whether the consumer has been informed of his right of cancellation.193
Article 4 of the Directive leaves discretion to the national authorities to
determine the consequences of a breach of the obligation to give notice, provided
that that discretion is exercised in conformity with the Directive’s aim of safe-
guarding the protection granted to consumers under appropriate conditions with
regard to the particular circumstances of the case.194 The Directive provides for a
minimum level of harmonisation inasmuch as, under Article 8, the Directive does
not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining more favourable provi-
189 Joined cases 430/93 and 431/94 Jeroen van Schijndel und Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen
v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705 (CJEU), paragraphs 21, 22.
190 Case 227/08 Eva Martín Martín v EDP Editores SL [2009] ECR I-11939 (CJEU), paragraphs 19,
20.
191 Case 412/06 Annelore Hamilton v Volksbank Filder eG [2008] ECR I-2383 (CJEU), paragraphs
32, 33.
192 Case 481/99 Georg Heininger und Helga Heininger v Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG
[2001] ECR I-9945 (CJEU), paragraph 45.
193 Case 227/08, n 190 above, paragraphs 27–29.
194 Case 227/08, n 190 above, paragraph 32.
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sions to protect consumers in the field which it covers.195 Declaring the contract in
dispute void can be categorised as ‘appropriate’ within the meaning of Article 4
of the Directive. This does however not rule out the possibility that other
measures might also ensure that level of protection, such as, for example, the
resetting of the relevant time‑limits relating to the cancellation of the contract.
Referring to Pannon GSM,196 the CJEU added that the national court may take
into account that the annulment is not always the wish of the consumer.197
Advocate-General Trstenjak comes to the conclusion that absolute nullity of the
contract, which the national court declares of its own motion if the consumer
has not been informed of his right of cancellation, is not an appropriate
consumer protection measure. The nullity of the contract could be not to the
benefit of the consumer, because the consumer is obliged by Spanish law to
return the goods in return for the purchase price already paid. According to the
Advocate-General, the national court is obliged ex officio to determine whether
the consumer has been informed of his right to cancel the contract and, in case
of a breach, it must inform the consumer of his right in accordance with the
consumer’s private autonomy.198
cc) Integration in the case law
ConsideringMostaza Claro199 and Pannon GSM,200 it seems likely that the national
courts are obliged to verify compliance with the Directive 85/577/EEC ex officio.
The rather vague formulations, however, which indicate an authority rather than
an obligation, seem to be based on the formulation of the question referred by the
Spanish court.201
195 Case 227/08, n 190 above, paragraph 33.
196 Case 243/08, n 2 above, paragraph 33.
197 Case 227/08, n 190 above, paragraphs 34–35.
198 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 7.5.2009 – case 227/08, n 190 above, paragraphs 75–86.
199 Case 168/05, n 4 above.
200 Case 243/08, n 2 above.
201 Ebers, n 25 above, 833; see also, M. Depince, case note, (2011) 2 Revue européenne de droit de
la consommation 383.
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b) Application of Directive 85/577/EEC to the cancellation of a closed-end real
property fund established in the form of a civil-law partnership
(Case C-215/08 E. Friz)
aa) Facts
The German Bundesgerichtshof asked the CJEU two questions relating to the
cancellation of an investment in a closed-end real property fund. In its first
question, it wanted to know whether the Directive 85/577 applies to a contract
concerning a consumer’s entry into a closed-end real property fund established in
the form of a partnership and creating a contractual relationship between the
consumer and the manager of that fund when the principal purpose of joining is
not to become a member of that partnership, but is a means of capital invest-
ment.202 The court also asked whether Article 5(2) of the Directive precludes a
national judge-made law according to which the consumer has a claim against
that partnership, to his severance balance, calculated on the basis of the value of
his interest at the date of his retirement from membership, and may therefore get
back less than the value of his capital contribution or have to participate in the
losses of that fund.
This case has to do with the wider issue of the acquisition of holdings in old
real property in Germany known as ‘Schrottimmobilien’ (junk property). Invest-
ment in such property was opted for primarily on account of the resultant tax
benefits, but has often failed to deliver the expected results.203 The consumer had
joined a closed-end real estate fund which had the legal form of a civil-law
partnership. After the consumer terminated without notice his participation in
that partnership, the partnership demanded the payment of € 16,319 as a negative
severance balance, which was the difference between the value of the original
investment and the consumer’s share of losses which had been incurred by that
partnership at the date that membership was cancelled. The appeal court rejected
any payment obligation on the part of the consumer, as the consumer should not
be subject to any more obligations under the cancelled contract in accordance
with Article 5(2) of the Directive.
202 The question of the German Federal Court of Justice covered not only the accession of a
consumer to a closed-end real property fund in the form of a partnership, but also to other types of
companies or associations, such as commercial partnerships, associations and cooperatives.
However, the CJEU came to the conclusion that it was not competent to answer this question with
respect to the other types of societies and associations, see case 215/08 E. Friz GmbH v Carsten von
der Heyden [2010] ECR I-2947 (CJEU), paragraphs 22–24.
203 On the scope and nature of the phenomenon, see: P. Derleder, ‘Bankschaden und Bankrecht’
(2003) 29Neue JuristischeWochenschrift 2064.
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bb) Main reasoning
The entry of a consumer into a closed-end real property fund in the form of a
partnership satisfies the conditions in Article 1(1) of Directive 85/577/EEC.204
Advocate-General Trstenjak had, however, held that the conditions governing the
existence of a contract within the meaning of Article 1(1) were not given, as
neither the initiator or founder nor the intermediary could be regarded as a
‘trader’ in the sense of Article 2 of the Directive.205 The CJEU, in contrast, made it
clear that the investment intermediary, acting expressly as manager of the real
property fund and earning a commission from that fund for every contract
concluded with a new partner, was commercially active.206 The CJEU also rejected
the argument of the German Government that the agreement concerned ‘other
rights relating to immovable property’ within the meaning of the exclusion in
Article 3(2)(a) of the Directive.207 As highlighted in Heiniger,208 derogations from
the Union legislation on consumer protection must be strictly construed.209 This
contract is exclusively concerned with joining a closed-end real proper fund by
means of the acquisition of holdings in a partnership in exchange for a capital
investment.210
Article 5(2) does not preclude the national judge-made rule which entitles the
consumer only to his severance balance in case he exercises his right to cancella-
tion. Although the Directive was designed to protect consumers, this does not
mean that the protection is ‘absolute’.211 In Schulte,212 the CJEU made it clear that
there is nothing in the Directive to preclude the consumer, in certain specific
cases, from having obligations to the trader and, depending on the circum-
stances, from having to bear certain consequences resulting from the exercise of
his right of cancellation.213 As the Bundesgerichtshof had stated, the German rule
at issue sought a satisfactory balance and a fair division of the risks among the
various interested parties in accordance with the general principles of civil law.214
204 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 30.
205 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 8.9.2009 – case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraphs 60–70.
206 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraphs 28, 29.
207 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 31.
208 Case 481/99, n 192 above, paragraph 31.
209 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 32.
210 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 33.
211 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 44. Under device to case 412/06, n 191 above, para-
graphs 39, 40.
212 Case 350/03 Elisabeth Schulte and Wolfgang Schulte v Deutsche Bausparkasse Badenia AG
[2005] ECR I-9215 (CJEU), paragraph 93.
213 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 45.
214 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 48.
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The consumer can recover his holding and take over a portion of the investment
risk, and thus the other partners and third-party creditors would be exempt from
the financial burden of the cancellation.215 As a result, the CJEU agrees with the
opinion of Advocate-General Trstenjak, who also affirmed the compatibility of the
national judge-made rule with the Directive for the case that the CJEU finds that
Directive 85/577 is applicable.216
cc) Integration in the case-law
According to the case-law of the German Bundesgerichtshof, the judge-made
law at issue is applicable where the consumer withdraws his membership of a
partnership.217 The purpose of reducing the entitlement of the consumer to his
severance balance should lie in a fair balance of interests between the with-
drawing consumer, the co-partners and third party creditors.218 The applicability
of the Directive to private companies is partially critically debated.219 It is
discussed whether the decision is transferable to other types of companies.220
The prevailing opinion is in favor of upholding the judge-made law, pointing
out that otherwise the protection of individual consumers comes at the detri-
ment of the other co-partners, who are also consumers. This is the only way to
avoid a race of investors to recover their holding.221 In addition, the consumer
215 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 49.
216 AG Trstenjak, n 205 above, paragraph 103.
217 BGH, 27.6.2006 – II ZR 218/04,Deutsches Steuerrecht 2006, 1664.
218 BGH, 5.5.2008 – IIZR 292/06, Wertpapier Mitteilungen 2008, 1026; see also J. Oechsler, ‘Die
Geschichte der Lehre von der fehlerhaften Gesellschaft und ihre Stellung im europäischen
Gesellschaftsrecht’ (2008) 34Neue JuristischeWochenschrift 2471.
219 For a critical opinion F. Podewils, ‘Haustürwiderrufsrichtlinie: Anwendung auf Personenge-
sellschaften – Fortgeltung der Grundsätze der fehlerhaften Gesellschaft’ (2010) 7 Europäisches
Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 265, 269; P. Kindler and S. Libbertz, ‘Gesellschaftsrechtliche Grenzen
des Verbraucherschutzes: Die Anwendung der Haustürgeschäfterichtlinie und der Lehre von der
fehlerhaften Gesellschaft auf den Beitritt zu einer Publikumspersonengesellschaft’ (2010) 16 Neue
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 603, 605; for a positive opinion C. Armbrüster, ‘Rückabwicklung
von Fondsbeteiligungen – deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht modifiziert europäisches Verbraucher-
schutzrecht’ (2010) 16 Europäische Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 614, 615.
220 Kindler and Libbertz, n 219 above, 605; W. Goette, case note, (2010) 17 Deutsches Steuerrecht
878, 881; C. Schäfer, ‘Fondsbeitritt an der Haustür – zu den Konsequenzen der Friz-Entscheidung
des EuGH’ (2010) 22Deutsches Steuerrecht 1138; Podewils, n 219 above, 267.
221 Armbrüster, n 219 above, 616; Goette, n 220 above; A. Miras, case note, (2010) 21 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1511; for a critical view Podewils, n 219 above, 269; H. Schulte-Nölke,
case note, (2009) LMKAnmerkung 275581.
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retains the possibility to claim damages against the promoters and founding
shareholders.222
c) Exclusion of unit-linked insurance contracts from the scope of Directive 85/
577/EEC (Case C-166/11 González Alonso)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Audiencia Provincial de Oviedo asked if according to Article 3(2)(d)
of Directive 85/577/EEC a unit-linked life insurance contract negotiated away
from business premises falls into the scope of this Directive.
The consumer requested the cancellation of the insurance contract and
claimed the repayments of the premiums paid. The Spanish court considered that
unit-linked insurance contracts are characterised by the fact that the insurer bears
only the actuarial risk while the financial risk of the investment is transferred to
the policyholder. It is the policyholder who assumes the risk in exchange for
certain tax advantages. In the view of the national court, the contract may be
classified not only as an insurance policy but also as a financial product. Only
pure insurance contracts are, in accordance with Article 3(2)(d), excluded from
the scope of Directive 85/577/EEC.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU ruled that Article 3(2)(d) of Directive 85/577/EEC also applies to unit-
linked insurance contracts. The term ‘insurance contract’ must be given an
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.223
Although derogations from the rules of European Union law for the protection of
consumers must be interpreted strictly, a too narrow interpretation of Article 3(2)
of Directive 85/577/EEC is excluded as the consumer protection under the Direc-
tive is not ‘absolute’ and subject to certain limits.224 Since unit-linked insurance
222 Miras, n 221 above; Schäfer, n 220 above, 1140, 1141; O. Mörsdorf, ‘Überrumpelungsschutz
gegen vertragsnahe Dritte? Der Anspruch des nicht über sein Haustürwiderrufsrecht belehrten
Immobilienerwerbers auf Schadensersatz’ (2012) 18 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 845; Armbrüs-
ter, n 219 above, 616.
223 Case 166/11 Ángel Lorenzo González Alonso v Nationale Nederlanden Vida Cía de Seguros y
Reaseguros SAE 1.3.2012 (CJEU), paragraph 25; as discussed by S. Weatherill, ‘Consumer protec-
tion under EU law “is not absolute”: yes, but be careful!’ (2012) 2 European Review of Contract Law
221, 227–232.
224 Case 166/11, n 223 above, paragraphs 26, 27.
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contracts are common practice in insurance law, as is clear from Annex I point III
in conjunction with Article 2(1)(a) of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life insur-
ance,225 it is assumed that the European Union legislature took this type of
contract as belonging to a branch of life insurance. An identical approach follows
from Article 1(1)(a) and point III of the Annex of the First Directive 79/267/EEC.226
These contracts are therefore not within the scope of Directive 85/577/EEC. This
does not, however, exclude the policyholder from cancelling the insurance con-
tract in accordance with Article 35(1) in conjunction with Article 36 and point A(a)
13 of Annex III of Directive 2002/83/EC. The requirements for this application are
to be examined by the national court.227
cc) Integration in the case-law
The Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU228 which came into force on 12.12.2011
does not lead to a different conclusion, since the exclusion of financial services in
Article 3(3)(d) in conjunction with Article 2(12) encompasses insurance contracts.
Some criticism has been directed against the overly narrow interpretation of the
exception in Article 3(2)(d) of Directive 85/577/EEC. In Hamilton229 and E. Friz,230
the CJEU had found that consumer protection is not ‘absolute’. However the CJEU
had to balance different interests in those cases as for example, the equitable
distribution of risk in a closed-end real estate fund against consumer protection.
This was not the situation in the case at stake. Therefore, it would have been more
convincing to limit the reasoning to the requirements set out by the European
Union legislature.231
225 Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002
concerning life assurance,OJ 2002 L345/1.
226 First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life
assurance,OJ 1979 L63/1.
227 Case 166/11, n 223 above, paragraphs 29–33.
228 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the Eur-
opean Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,OJ 2011 L304/64.
229 Case 412/06, n 191 above, paragraph 39.
230 Case 215/08, n 202 above, paragraph 44.
231 Weatherill, n 223 above, 227–232.
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3 Distance selling (Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts and Santurel
Inter; case C-489/07 Messner; case C-511/08 Heinrich Heine;
case C-49/11 Content Services)
a) Prohibition on requiring from a consumer any payment or a credit card details
before the end of the period for withdrawal (Case C-205/07 Gysbrechts and
Santurel Inter)
aa) Facts
In the preliminary reference from the Belgian Hof van Beroep te Gent, the CJEU
had to take a position on the question whether or not Articles 34–36 TFEU (ex
Articles 28–30 EC) preclude the Belgian law implementing the Distance Selling
Directive 97/7/EC,232 which prohibits the supplier from requiring a credit card
number or any kind of payment before the expiry of the period for withdrawal of
seven working days, even if the seller agrees not to use it before the end of the
withdrawal period.
The Belgian retailer of food supplements required a French customer to
furnish the number and validity period of his credit card before the expiry of the
period for withdrawal. According to the terms and conditions of the online
retailer, goods delivered in Belgium could be paid for by bank transfer, postal
order or by credit card. For orders from other countries, however, only credit cards
were accepted as payment. If a payment was made by credit card, the customer
must specify the number and expiry date of the card on the purchase order. The
trial court sentenced the business and its general manager to a fine of €1,250
each.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU clarified, first, that the contested regulation falls within the scope of
Directive 97/7/EC which, in accordance with Article 14(1), consisted of only
minimum harmonization and thus allowed for more stringent national rules in
favour of a higher level of consumer protection. Any national regulations going
beyond the Directive are to be measured against the provisions of EC Treaty.233
Since the proceedings at issue do not concern the importing of goods to Belgium,
but only the export of goods from Belgium to other Member States, the CJEU
232 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts,OJ 1997 L144/19.
233 Case 205/07 Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA [2008] ECR I-9947 (CJEU), para-
graphs 32–35.
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excluded the application of Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC).234 On the compat-
ibility of national legislation with Article 35 TFEU (ex Article 29 EC), the CJEU
referred to the test established in Groenveld235 for the definition of measures
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on exports.236 Even if the
clause formally applies to all national operators, exports were actually more
affected than the sale of goods on the domestic market. The national ban deprived
the trader of an effective tool to protect himself against the risk of non-payment,
the consequences of which were even more severe for cross-border direct selling.
Therefore, the national legislation must be regarded as a measure having equiva-
lent effect to a quantitative restriction on exports.237 In contrast, Advocate-General
Trstenjak rejected the findings of the national court that it is more difficult and
more onerous to recover sums from consumers established in other Member
States. The seller need not always sue the consumer in the Member State in which
the consumer has his habitual residence, and the Community has already
adopted a number of measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters
having cross-border implications.238 However, Advocate-General Trstenjak came
to the same conclusion as the CJEU, since she rejected the narrow application of
the Groenveld test and pleaded for an adapted formulation drawn from Dasson-
ville,239 Cassis de Dijon240 and Keck and Mithouard.241, 242
In its examination of Article 36 TFEU (ex Article 30 EC), the CJEU refers to
Cassis de Dijon243 and A-Punkt Schmuckhandel244 and determines whether the
Belgian legislation can be justified on the basis of the consumer protection goals
pursued.245 In principle, the Belgian legislation is likely to achieve a high level of
consumer protection in case of distance contracts, especially in relation to the
234 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraph 36.
235 Case 15/79 P B Groenveld BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1979] ECR 3409 (CJEU),
paragraph 7.
236 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraph 40.
237 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraphs 41–44.
238 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 17.7.2008 – case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraphs 38, 39.
239 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 (CJEU).
240 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649
(CJEU).
241 Joined cases 267/91 and 268/91 Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 (CJEU).
242 AG Trstenjak, n 238 above, paragraphs 49 et seq.
243 Case 120/78, n 240 above, paragraph 8.
244 Case 441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandels GmbH v Claudia Schmidt [2006] ECR I-2093 (CJEU),
paragraph 27.
245 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraph 47.
Overview of cases before the CJEU 49
Brought to you by | Erasmus University Rotterdam
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/12/20 11:34 AM
exercise of the right to withdraw.246 Even if the prohibition on requiring a payment
during the period for withdrawal increases the uncertainty of suppliers as to
whether the price for the delivered goods will be paid, that prohibition is clearly
necessary to ensure the level of protection intended by the national provision.247
However, to impose on a supplier a prohibition on requiring that a consumer
provides his credit card number goes beyond what is necessary to attain the
objective pursued and is incompatible with Article 35 TFEU.248
cc) Integration in the case-law
The significance of the judgment lies in the interpretation of Article 35 TFEU. Even
if the CJEU, contrary to the suggestion of the Advocate-General, applied the
Groenveld test, it only explicitly considered the second criterion, namely whether
the measure gives rise to a difference in treatment between the domestic trade of
a Member State and its export trade. The CJEU thus pushed aside the first criterion
of the Groenveld test, whether the object or effect of the measure is the restriction
specifically of patterns of exports, as well as the third requirement, whether the
measure provides a particular advantage for national production or for the
domestic market of the State in question, at the expense of the trade or production
of other Member States. By means of the broad interpretation of the otherwise
restrictive Groenveld test, the CJEU fits it into its case-law in Keck, leading to a
convergence of standards.249
This result is welcomed in the literature, since, as pointed out by Advocate-
General Trstenjak, first, the difference in treatment under the Groenveld test
cannot be detected when a product destined for export is not marketed domes-
tically; secondly, because Article 34 and 35 TFEU pursue the same objective,
namely the elimination of all barriers to trade flows in intra-Community trade’;
and, thirdly, because it represents a departure from the Groenveld test towards a
246 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraph 52.
247 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraph 56.
248 Case 205/07, n 233 above, paragraphs 60–62. The CJEU refers to para 85 of the opinion of
Advocate-General Trstenjak which turns on striking a fair balance between a high level of
consumer protection and the protection of the seller against the risk that the consumer does not
pay.
249 B. Schinkels, case note, (2009) LMK Anmerkung 275639; A. Brigola, ‘Die Figur der Marktaus-
trittsbeschränkungen als Korrelat der Figur der Marktzugangsbeschränkungen – Zur Kohärenz
der EG-Grundfreiheiten anlässlich des Urteils des EuGH vom 16.12.2008 – C-205/07 – Gysbrechts
u.a.’ (2009) 14 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht 479, 481, 482; W.H. Roth, case note,
(2010) 2 CommonMarket Law Review 509, 514, 515.
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gradual standardization of the fundamental freedoms.250 Micklitz and Reich,
however, observe critically that the minimum harmonization nature of the Direc-
tive could be abolished through the ‘back door’ as a result.251
As is generally known, a restriction on the free movement of goods can be
justified on the grounds of consumer protection. Thus, a parallelization of written
and unwritten grounds of justification in terms of both Article 34 and Article 35 is
ensured.252 In contrast, Article 5(2) of the Rome Convention of 1980 and Article 6
(1) of the Rome I Regulation prioritize the mandatory consumer protection provi-
sions of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence. In Alpine
Investments,253 the CJEU still rejected the extraterritorial extension of the public
interest.254 One criticism, from the consumer’s point of view, is that they are
saddled with the risk of the seller abusing the credit card payment and going
bankrupt before the expiry of the cancellation period.255 Article 9(3) of Directive
2011/83/EU allows Member States to maintain existing national legislation on
distance contracts ‘prohibiting the trader from collecting the payment from the
consumer during the given period after the conclusion of the contract.’
b) Compensation for consumer’s use of the goods supplied in the event
of withdrawal within the withdrawal period (Case C-489/07 Messner)
aa) Facts
The Amtsgericht Lahr asked the CJEU whether Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) of
Directive 97/7 preclude a provision of national law which provides that, in the
case of withdrawal by a consumer within the withdrawal period, a seller may
claim compensation for the value of the use of consumer goods acquired under a
distance contract.
The consumer purchased a second-hand laptop on the internet. According to
the terms and conditions of the seller, the purchaser would be liable to pay
250 Brigola, n 249 above, 482, 483; J. Gundel, ‘Anwendung der Keck-Formel auf Beschränkun-
gen der Warenausfuhr gem. Art. 29 EGV’ (2009) 7 Juristische Arbeitsblätter 558, 560; Roth, n 249
above, 509.
251 On the opinion of the Advocate-General: H.-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘Vollharmonisierung
durch die Hintertür? Zur Kritik der Schlussanträge der GÄin Trstenjak v. 17.7.2008 in der Rs.
C-205/07 –Gysbrechts’ (2008) 9Verbraucher und Recht 349, 350.
252 Gundel, n 250 above, 560; Roth, n 249 above, 515, 516.
253 Case 384/93 Alpine Investments v Ministerie van Financien [1995] ECR I-1141 (CJEU), para-
graph 43.
254 Schinkels, n 249 above; Roth, n 249 above, 515–519.
255 On the opinion of the Advocate-General, Micklitz and Reich, n 251 above, 350.
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compensation for value in respect of deterioration in goods through use for their
intended purpose in the event of withdrawal. After the buyer refused to repair the
defect of the laptop for free, the consumer revoked the contract before the expiry
of the cancellation period. Since the buyer refused to accept the return of the
laptop, the consumer brought an action for the refund of the purchase price. In
contrast, the buyer argued that the consumer is obliged to pay it compensation
for value inasmuch as she had been using the laptop.
bb) Main reasoning
According to Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 97/7/EC, no further cost than the
direct cost of returning the goods shall be imposed on the consumer upon the
exercise of his right of withdrawal. The 14th recital clarifies that the right of
withdrawal is ‘to be more than formal’.256 The disadvantage of not being able
actually to see the product or ascertain the nature of the service provided before
concluding the distance contract should be compensated for by granting an
appropriate period for reflection during which the consumer can examine and test
the goods acquired.257 The general requirement to pay compensation, which
would be paid solely because the consumer has the opportunity to use the goods
until the expiry of his right of withdrawal, is contrary to the wording and purpose
of Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 97/7.258 A seller’s right to compensation
adversely affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the right of withdrawal.259
However, the Directive 97/7/EC provides the consumer with no rights that go
beyond what is necessary for the effective exercise of this right.260 Article 6(1) and
(2) of Directive 97/7/EC do not preclude national legislation which requires the
consumer to pay a fair compensation if he has used the goods in a way which is
incompatible with the ‘principles of civil law, such as those of good faith or unjust
enrichment.’261 The efficiency and effectiveness of the right of withdrawal would
be adversely affected if the amount of compensation would be disproportionate
to the purchase price of the goods or if the consumer would have to bear the
evidential burden of proving that he did not use the product in a manner which
went beyond what was necessary to permit him to make effective use of his right
256 Case 489/07 PiaMessner v Firma Stefan Krüger [2009] ECR I-07315 (CJEU), paragraph 19.
257 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 20.
258 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraphs 22, 23.
259 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 24.
260 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 25.
261 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 26.
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of withdrawal.262 It is the task of the national court, taking into account the
circumstances of the concrete case, in particular the nature of the goods and the
length of time at the end of which the consumer exercised his right of withdrawal,
to decide whether a compensation obligation of the consumer for the use of the
goods is appropriate.263
cc) Integration in the case-law
The decision of the CJEU has to correct many different opinions in German legal
literature.264 The newly framed § 312e of the German Civil Code265 obliges the
consumer in distance contracts, notwithstanding § 357(1), to pay compensation
where he has used the goods in a way that goes beyond testing the properties and
functioning (no 1), and if he has been informed by the seller of this legal conse-
quence and in accordance with § 360(1) or (2) of his right to withdraw and to
return goods or otherwise has knowledge of both (no 2). The first condition allows
the consumer to inspect the goods as would normally be the case in a shop. To
ensure the effectiveness of the right of withdrawal in accordance with the inter-
pretation of the CJEU, the presence of both conditions has to be proven by the
seller.266 As pointed out by Advocate-General Trstenjak, a possible abuse by
individual consumers must not result in a general restriction of rights guaranteed
under Community law.267 Article 14(2) of Directive 2011/83/EU implements the
CJEU’s decision in theMessner case.268
262 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 27.
263 Case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 28.
264 See for example B. Schinkels, case note, (2009) LMK Anmerkung 291092; O. Damm, case
note, (2009) 11MultiMedia und Recht 744.
265 Law of 27.7.2011 (BGBl I, 1600); see also A. Bartholomä, ‘Die Systematik des neuen Werter-
satzregimes nach Widerruf’ (2012) 25 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1761; C. Wendehorst, ‘Dauer-
baustelle Verbrauchervertrag: Wertersatz bei Widerruf von Fernabsatzverträgen’ (2011) 35 Neue
JuristischeWochenschrift 2551.
266 P. Rott, ‘The Balance of Interests in Distance Selling Law – Case Note on PiaMessner v. Firma
Stefan Krüger’ (2010) 1 European Review of Private Law 185, 190, 191.
267 AG Trstenjak, opinion of 18.2.2009 – case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 90.
268 P. Rott, ‘More coherence? A higher level of consumer protection? – A review of the new
Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU’ (2012) 3 Revue européenne de droit de la consommation
371, 384.
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c) Refund of the delivery costs in case of revocation of a distance contract
(Case C-511/08 Heinrich Heine)
aa) Facts
The German Bundesgerichtshof asked the CJEU whether the provisions of Ar-
ticle 6(1) and (2) of Directive 97/7/EC preclude national legislation which provides
that the cost of delivering the goods can be charged to the consumer upon
withdrawal.
The mail-order company provided in its general terms and conditions that the
consumer, in case of withdrawal, would not be refunded the delivery charge. The
consumer organization brought an action against the company for an injunction
to restrain it from charging consumers the cost of delivering the goods in the
event of withdrawal. The lower court agreed with the consumer organization. The
German Federal Court of Justice referred in its submission to several arguments
that could suggest that the Directive 97/7/EC does not preclude the national
legislation at stake.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU dealt first with the meaning of the phrase ‘sums paid by the consumer’
in Article 6(2). All payments made by the consumer in connection with the
contract would be covered. The wording ‘the only charge’ in Article 6(2) confirms
that a strict interpretation is appropriate.269 In order to interpret the phrase
‘because of the exercise of his right of withdrawal’, the CJEU relied on the
purpose and general scheme of the rules of which the provision forms part.270 To
ensure that the right of withdrawal of the consumer is ‘more than formal’, the
costs that are born by the consumer as a result of exercising the right of with-
drawal must be limited to the direct cost of returning the goods.271 The imposition
of delivery costs could dissuade the consumer from exercising his right to with-
drawal and would run counter to the objective of the Directive.272 The fact that
the consumer has been informed of the amount of the delivery costs prior to
concluding the contract cannot neutralise the dissuasive effect which the char-
ging of those costs to the consumer would have on his exercise of his right of
269 Case 511/08 Handelsgesellschaft Heinrich Heine GmbH v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-
Westfalen eV [2010] ECR I-03047 (CJEU), paragraphs 45–47.
270 Case 511/08, n 269 above, paragraph 51.
271 Case 511/08, n 269 above, paragraphs 54, 55. With reference to the recital 14 of Directive 97/
7/EC and the case law of the CJEU in case 489/07, n 256 above, paragraph 19.
272 Case 511/08, n 269 above, paragraph 56.
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withdrawal.273 Moreover, charging the consumer would compromise a balanced
sharing of the risks between parties to distance contracts, by making consumers
liable to bear all of the costs related to transporting the goods.274
cc) Integration in the case-law
Contrary to the opinions of the German government, the CJEU made clear that the
mail-order company should not impose the costs for sending the goods on the
consumer. The result is economically fair, since the consumer is adequately
involved by the imposition of the return costs.275 The additional burden on the
distance selling company would be compensated for by the savings in the cost of
rental of stores and sales staff.276 Offers whereby goods are shipped for free (ie
shipping costs are included in the purchase price) remain attractive for compa-
nies. It would create no incentive to lower the purchase price and offset this by
setting the shipping costs higher in order to secure a concealed profit in the event
of cancellation.277 Directive 2011/83/EU on Consumer Rights provides in Article 13
(1) that the company has an obligation to repay the cost of delivery, unless the
consumer has opted for a different more expensive type method of delivery than
the standard delivery offered by the trader. According to Article 14(1), the con-
sumer must bear the cost of returning the goods.278
d) Consumer information on conclusion of a distance contract only available by
hyperlink on the company website (Case C-49/11 Content Services)
aa) Facts
The Austrian Oberlandesgericht Wien asked whether Article 5(1) of Directive 97/7
must be interpreted as meaning that a business practice consisting of making the
information referred to in that provision accessible to the consumer only via a
273 Case 511/08, n 269 above, paragraph 58.
274 Case 511/08, n 269 above, paragraph 57.
275 U. Grohmann and N. Gruschinske, ‘Versandkosten bei Fernabsatzgeschäften im Falle des
Widerrufs – Kommentar zu den Schlussanträgen des Generalanwalts in der Rechtssache C-511/08’
(2010) 7 Europäische Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 245, 246.
276 D. Looschelders, ‘Unzulässige Belastung des Verbrauchers mit Zusendungskosten bei Wi-
derruf eines Fernabsatzvertrags’ (2010) 11 Juristische Arbeitsblätter 825, 826.
277 B. Schinkels, case note, (2010) LMKAnmerkung 303287.
278 Rott, n 268 above, 384.
Overview of cases before the CJEU 55
Brought to you by | Erasmus University Rotterdam
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/12/20 11:34 AM
hyperlink on a website of the undertaking concerned meets the requirements of
that provision.
Content Services Ltd offers free software and trial versions of paid software to
download on its website. To use the website, including accessing links which
refer to the official sites of the program manufacturers, the customer must sign a
subscription contract. The contract is concluded by filling out an online registra-
tion form on the company website. By ticking a box when submitting their
contract, customer must agree at that point that they accept the general terms and
conditions and waive their right of withdrawal. The information required under
Articles 4 and 5 of the Directive, particularly the information concerning the right
of withdrawal, is not shown directly to the customer who may, however, view it
by clicking on a hyperlink on the contract sign-up page. After conclusion of the
contract, the customer receives a confirmation e-mail containing his data and
another link which provides information about the right of withdrawal. The
customer subsequently receives an invoice, which reminds him that he has
waived the right of withdrawal.
bb) Main reasoning
According to Article 5(1) of Directive 97/7/EC the consumer must already be
‘given’ the information referred to in Article 4(1) prior to conclusion of the contract
or else the consumer can ‘receive’ the information during the performance of the
contract through a confirmation. In both cases, the information must be sub-
mitted in writing or in another ‘durable medium’ available and accessible to the
consumer.279 The CJEU concluded that the information is neither ‘given to’ nor
‘received’ by the consumer when it is only made accessible by a link. The
consumer protection targeted by the Directive requires that the use of distance
communication does not lead to a reduction of the information provided.280
The CJEU considered whether information on a website which is accessible
for the consumer through a link is to be regarded as a ‘durable medium’. A
replacement for the paper forms was deemed acceptable if it fulfills the same
function as the paper forms.281 Referring to the definitions of the term ‘durable
medium’ in other European legislation282 and in the judgment of the EFTA Court
279 Case 49/11 Content Service Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer 05.07.2012 (CJEU), paragraphs 28, 29.
280 Case 49/11, n 279 above, paragraphs 33–37; Referring to recital 11 of Directive 97/7/EC.
281 Case 49/11, n 279 above, paragraph 41.
282 Art 2(f) Directive 2002/65; art 2(12) Directive 2002/92; art 3(m) Directive 2008/48; art 2(10)
Directive 2011/83.
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in Inconsult Institute/Finanzmarktaufsicht,283 the CJEU found that a medium must
be regarded as ‘durable’ within the meaning of that provision where it allows the
consumer to store the information which has been addressed to him personally,
in a way that the information is accessible for an adequate period which gives the
consumer the possibility to reproduce it unchanged and without the possibility of
a unilateral change by the seller.284 A website whose information can only be
accessed via a link cannot be regarded as a ‘durable medium’ under Article 5(1) of
Directive 97/7/EC.285 The CJEU’s judgment follows the conclusion of Advocate-
General Mengozzi.286
cc) Integration in the case-law
The case offered the CJEU the opportunity to address the requirements of informa-
tion transfer in the context of new technologies. Even if the law must adapt to
new technologies, this should not happen at the expense of consumer protec-
tion.287 The CJEU did not take a position on what kind of more developed sites
could meet the requirements of a durable medium.288 A restriction to using only
abstract criteria is to be welcomed in the light of new technological develop-
ments, as noted in the opinion of Advocate-General Mengozzi.289 The CJEU is
criticized for departing from the idea of a completely passive consumer, although
putting a hyperlink to surf the Internet is common.290 In order to avoid legal
uncertainty, General Mengozzi suggests integrating the information directly into
the text of the e-mail. In view of the strict and formalistic interpretation of the
wording in Article 5(1) of the Directive, it remains to be seen whether anything
will change due to the new wording of the Directive 2011/83/EU, which in Ar-
283 EFTA Court, 27.1.2010 – E-4/09 Inconsult Anstalt/Finanzmarktaufsicht Court Report 2009/
2010, 86.
284 Case 49/11, n 279 above, paragraphs 43–45.
285 Case 49/11, n 279 above, paragraph 50.
286 AGMengozzi, opinion of 6.3.2012 – case 49/11, n 279 above.
287 G. Brunaux, ‘De l’utilisation de pages web pour l’exécution des obligations d’information
d’un contrat conclu par la voie électronique’ (2013) 7 Petites affiches. La Loi/Le Quotidien juridique
10; see also C. Goata, ‘Information Duties in the Internet Era: Case Note on Content Services Ltd v.
Bundesarbeitskammer’ (2013) 2 European Review of Private Law 643.
288 Case 49/11, n 279 above, paragraphs 48–50.
289 AGMengozzi, n 286 above, paragraph 17.
290 Brunaux, n 287 above.
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ticle 8(7)(a) requires that the supplier ‘shall provide’ the consumer the necessary
information.291
4 Sale of consumer goods (Joined cases C-65/09 Gebrüder
Weber, C-87/09 Putz; case C-32/12 Duarte Hueros)
a) Obligation on the seller to remove the defective goods and install the
replacement goods (Joined cases C-65/09 Gebrüder Weber, C-87/09 Putz)
aa) Facts
The preliminary reference from the German Bundesgerichtshof (C-65/09) of
14 January 2009 and the Amtsgericht at Schorndorf (C-87/09) of 25 February 2009
concerned the interpretation of Article 3(2) and (3) of the Consumer Sales Directive
1999/44/EC. May the buyer also require the seller to cover the installation and
removal costs based on the claim of replacement where the item purchased turns
out to be deficient after installation? May the seller refuse the type of remedy
required by the consumer when the remedy would result in the seller incurring
costs which, compared with the value the consumer goods would have if there
were no lack of conformity, and with the significance of the lack of conformity,
would be unreasonable (absolutely disproportionate)?
In case C-65/09 (Gebrüder Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer) the parties entered
into a contract to purchase polished floor tiles for the price of EUR 1,382.27. After
having had about two thirds of the tiles laid in his house, Mr Wittmer noticed that
there was shading on the tiles which was visible to the naked eye. The appointed
expert concluded that the shadings were fine micro-brush-marks which could not
be removed, so that the only remedy possible was complete replacement of the
tiles. The expert estimated the cost of this at EUR 5,830.57. The appeal court
ordered Weber to deliver a new set of tiles free from defects and to pay Mr Wittmer
EUR 2,122.37 for removing and disposing of the defective tiles. Weber appealed
against that judgment before the Federal Court of Justice.
In case C-87/09 (Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH), the parties
concluded a contract to purchase a new dishwasher over the Internet. After the
consumer had the dishwasher installed in her house, a defect, which could not be
repaired, became apparent. The parties then agreed on the replacement of the
291 A. Stadtler and J. Weissel, ‘Fernabsatz-Richtlinie: Hyperlink kein “dauerhafter Datenträger”’
(2012) 4 European Law Reporter 117.
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dishwasher. The consumer demanded that Medianess Electronics delivered a new
dishwasher, and also remove the defective machine and install the replacement
machine or pay the costs of such. Since Medianess failed to respond to the notice,
the consumer rescinded the contract of sale and brought proceedings against
Medianess Electronics before the Local Court at Schorndorf seeking reimburse-
ment of the purchase price against return of the defective dishwasher.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU ruled that the seller is obliged under Article 3(2) and (3) of the Directive,
to restore the goods to conformity with the contract through the removal of the
original goods and installation of the replacement goods, or bearing the cost of
such, regardless of whether the installation was originally subject to the contract
of sale. The CJEU relies largely on the wording of Article 3(2) and (3), the Quelle
decision292 and the purpose of the Directive to ensure a high level of consumer
protection. The European Union legislature intended to make the ‘free of charge’
aspect of the seller’s obligation to bring goods into conformity ‘an essential
element of the protection afforded to consumers by that directive’.293 The consu-
mer should be protected from risks of financial burdens which might dissuade
him from asserting their rights.294 Although the removal and installation costs
were not explicitly referred to in Article 3(4), that enumeration of the various
types of cost is only illustrative and not exhaustive.295 The ‘repair and replacement
of goods not in conformity’ is to be completed not only free of charge but also
within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer
pursuant to Article 3(3).296 Such an interpretation does not lead to an inequitable
outcome. Even assuming that the non-conformity of goods was not the fault of
the seller, by delivering goods not in conformity the seller fails correctly to
perform the obligation which he accepted in the contract of sale, and must there-
fore bear the consequences of that. In contrast, the fact that the consumer,
confident in the conformity of the goods delivered, installed the defective goods,
in good faith, in a manner consistent with their nature and purpose, before the
292 Case 404/06Quelle AG v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände
[2008] ECR I-02685 (CJEU); discussed by K. Lilleholt, (2010) 2 European Review of Contract Law
192.
293 Joined cases 65/09 Gebrüder Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and 87/09 Ingrid Putz v Media-
ness Electronics GmbH [2011] ECR I-05257, paragraph 46.
294 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 46.
295 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 50.
296 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 52.
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defect became apparent, cannot be held against him as a fault.297The seller’s
financial interests are protected by the two-year time-limit laid down in Article 5
(1) of the Directive and by the fact that, under the second subparagraph of Article
3(3) of the Directive, the seller may refuse to replace the goods where that remedy
would be disproportionate in that it would impose unreasonable costs on him as
well as the right of redress, reaffirmed in Article 4 of the Directive, against persons
liable in the same contractual chain.298
Article 3(3) precludes national legislation which gives the seller the right to
refuse replacement where it is the only possible type of remedy just because it
would result in costs that would be disproportionate compared with the value of
the non-defective consumer goods and the significance of the defect. Therefore if
only one of the two remedies mentioned in Article 3(3) is possible, the seller may
not refuse the only remedy which allows the goods to be brought into conformity
with the contract.299 However, the consumer’s right to reimbursement of the cost
of removing the defective goods and installing the replacement goods can be
limited, where necessary, to an amount proportionate to the value the goods
would have if there were no lack of conformity and the significance of the lack of
conformity.300 However, the possibility of making such a reduction must not
result in the consumer’s right to reimbursement of those costs being effectively
rendered devoid of substance in practice.301 In such a situation, the consumer
should be able to request, instead of replacement of the goods not in conformity,
an appropriate price reduction or rescission of the contract.302 The CJEU comes to
a different conclusion than the Advocate-General Mazák, who restricted his con-
clusions to a reasonable balance of interests between buyer and seller.303 Advo-
cate-General Mazák refused to extend the duty owed by the seller to include
disconnection the defective product and installing the new product free from
defects unless the installation of the product formed part of the contract agreed
between the seller and the consumer.304 The denial of a remedy because of an
absolute lack of proportionality was compatible with the Directive.305
297 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 56.
298 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 58.
299 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 71.
300 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 74.
301 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 76.
302 Cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraph 77.
303 AGMazák, opinion of 18.5.2010 – cases 65/09 and 87/09, n 293 above, paragraphs 48, 85.
304 AGMazák, n 303 above, paragraph 67.
305 AGMazák, n 303 above, paragraph 88.
60 Hans-W. Micklitz and Betül Kas
Brought to you by | Erasmus University Rotterdam
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/12/20 11:34 AM
cc) Integration in the case-law
The CJEU established under the claim for subsequent performance a strict obliga-
tion of the seller to perform or to pay the costs incurred for the removal and
replacement of the defective goods. The CJEU therefore interferes with the con-
tractual balance between the parties, since the seller must provide additional
services that were not provided in the contract. This would appear to call into
question the exclusive legislative competence of the Member States relating to
claims for damages in the sale of consumer goods.306 The judgment has been
called in German literature a ‘bang from Luxembourg’307 and ‘consumer rights
social romanticism’.308 Nevertheless, the practical implications are not entirely
seen as consumer-friendly as it is expected that sellers will take these economic
burdens into account in setting their prices.309
b) Purchase price reduction of a defective product where rescission of the
contract is excluded (Case C-32/12 Duarte Hueros)
aa) Facts
The Spanish Juzgado de Primera Instancia n° 2 of Badajoz referred to the CJEU the
question, whether according to Directive 1999/44/EC a national court may of its
own motion reduce the purchase price of a defective product if the consumer has
sought only rescission of the contract, to which, however, he is not entitled owing
to the minor nature of the defect.
The consumer purchased a car with a sliding roof from Autociba. As the roof
of the convertible car turned out to be not watertight when it rained, the consumer
returned the car to the seller. Following several unsuccessful attempts to repair
the roof and Autociba’s refusal to replace the car, the consumer initiated legal
proceedigs seeking rescission of the sale contract and repayment of the purchase
price. The national court refused to rescind the contract due to the minor nature
of the lack of conformity. While the consumer is entitled to a reduction of the
306 B. Krebe, case note, (2012) 1 European Review of Private Law 255, 260; see also A. Fromont
and C. Verdure, case note, (2012) 1 Revue européenne de droit de la consummation 141.
307 K. Purnhagen, ‘Zur Auslegung der Nacherfüllungsverpflichtung – Ein Paukenschlag aus
Luxemburg’ (2011) 16 Europäische Zeitschrift fürWirtschaftsrecht 626.
308 S. Lorenz, ‘Ein- und Ausbauverpflichtung des Verkäufers bei der kaufrechtlichen Nacherfül-
lung’ (2011) 31Neue JuristischeWochenschrift 2241, 2243.
309 Lorenz, n 308 above, 2243; J. Glöckner, ‘Von Greenman v. Yuba zu Gebr. Weber und Putz –
der EuGH geht den nächsten Schritt auf dem Wege der Ökonomisierung des Europäischen
Verbraucherprivatrechts’ (2011) 9 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 359, 362; A. Johnston
andH. Unberath, note, (2012) 2 CommonMarket Law Review 793, 807.
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purchase price, Spanish procedural law precludes the award of this remedy as the
consumer did not, at least in the alternative, request a price reduction. The
consumer is also unable to defer her claim for price reduction to later proceedings
as the principle of res judicata covers all claims which could have been made, but
were not made, in earlier proceedings.
bb) Main reasoning
The CJEU held that in the case where a consumer is entitled to a reduction of the
purchase price but claims only the rescission of the contract, which is, however,
excluded by the minor nature of the defect, and the consumer is not entitled to
refine his initial application or to initiate new legal proceedings to that end,
Directive 1999/44/EC precludes national legislation which does not allow the
national court to grant of its ownmotion an appropriate reduction of the purchase
price. Because the Directive does not indicate how the rights derived from the
Directive are to be asserted in judicial proceedings, those procedural rules fall
within the national procedural autonomy, subject to the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness.310 While there is no apparent breach of the principle of equiva-
lence, the Spanish procedural rules undermine the effectiveness of the consumer
protection intended by the European Union legislature.311 In the situation at hand,
the Spanish procedural system deprives the consumer of the possibility of benefit-
ting from the right to seek an appropriate price reduction pursuant to Article 3(5)
of Directive 1999/44, except where the consumer’s application contains an alter-
native claim to that end.312 However, the CJEU regards this eventuality as very
improbable either because of the strict requirement that the alternative claim has
to be presented at the same time as the principal claim or because the consumer
is not aware of the extent of his rights.313 The protection of the consumer under
Article 3(5) of the Directive is rendered completly uncertain as the Spanish
procedural rules oblige the consumer to anticipate the outcome of the analysis by
the national court of the legal characterisation of the lack of conformity.314 In line
with the observations of Advocate-General Kokott, the CJEU concluded that the
Spanish procedural rules are in breach with the principle of effectiveness as they
render it excessively difficult, if not impossible, for the consumer to exercise his
310 Case 32/12 Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA und Automóviles Citroën España SA
3.10.2013 (CJEU), paragraphs 30, 31.
311 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraphs 32, 33.
312 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraph 37.
313 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraph 38.
314 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraph 40.
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rights under the Directive 1999/44/EC in case the goods delivered are not in
conformity with the contract.315 It is left to the national court to determine how to
solve this issue guaranteeing the full effectiveness of Article 3(5) of Directive
1999/44.316
cc) Integration in the case-law
It is interesting to note that Advocate-General Kokott expresses doubts as to the
classification of the defect as ‘minor’ and mentions that the Spanish court should
have referred also the question of what constitutes a minor nature of a defect for a
preliminary ruling. There is no uniform interpretation of a ‘minor’ defect in EU
law and other national courts have ruled in comparable cases that the entry of
water is not to be regarded as a defect of minor nature.317
315 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraph 41.
316 Case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraph 42.
317 AGKokott, opinion of 28.2.2013 – case 32/12, n 310 above, paragraphs 55–57.
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